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Abstract 
Un-bonded flexible pipelines and risers are an alternative to conventional rigid steel pipes. The use of 
flexible pipes has enabled development of several offshore fields that seemed unfeasible with the 
use of rigid pipes due to extensive seabed preparation and large dynamic motions.  The lack of 
knowledge and integrity management tools for flexible pipes is a limiting factor and cause pipelines 
and risers to be replaced before their service life has been reached. This thesis aims to discover the 
critical failure modes for flexible pipes and explore conventional and novel techniques for performing 
inspection and monitoring. By understanding the failures and having access to the necessary 
technology the remaining lifetime and lifetime extension calculation will be more accurate than to 
date. Degradations and failure mechanisms will be detected at an early stage giving the operators 
better time to initiate mitigating and repair measures. 
By contacting industry experts and performing a study of the latest literature this thesis presents the 
possible failure modes for flexible pipes, as well as a screening of conventional and novel inspection 
and monitoring techniques. Reported incidents for Norway, UK and the rest of the world are 
presented to reveal the greatest risks for flexible risers. An integrity management strategy is based 
on the reported incidents, including recommendations and purpose of inspection and monitoring 
techniques. 
Based on incident reports and inputs from stakeholders the most frequent and critical failures to 
flexible pipes caused by to damage to and degradation of the internal and external polymer sheath. 
Breach of the outer sheath creates a hazardous environment in the annulus leading to an increased 
risk for several failure mechanisms. Degradation of the internal pressure sheath threatens the fluid 
containment integrity, and is difficult to inspect for. It is recommended to have a well-functioning 
annulus vent system attached to a monitoring system to control the annulus environment. 
Integrated fiber optics is considered as the most promising technique currently under development. 
This would provide continuous temperature monitoring throughout the riser and pipeline which can 
be used for outer sheath breach detection and temperature degradation calculations. For existing 
pipelines a number of solutions are under development for integrity management, such as 
radiography, ultrasonic testing, and magnetic stress measurement among others. Individually they 
are useful, but if combined they might act as powerful multipurpose tools.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Flexible pipelines and risers have been in use worldwide for over 30 years and serve as an alternative 
for the conventional rigid steel pipe. Flexible un-bonded pipes consist of different layers of different 
materials that act together and allow for unique flexibility compared to rigid steel pipes. This 
complexity has facilitated the development of several fields and subsea tiebacks that would have 
been economically unfeasible with rigid pipes due to the need for extensive seabed preparations. 
Flexible risers ease the use of floating production facilities since they have a better dynamic response 
than conventional steel risers. 
However, the complexity of flexible pipes makes them more vulnerable to degradations and the 
number of failure modes is considerably higher. The use of different materials enclosed within 
several layers makes the task of integrity management difficult. Still after so many years of 
development, manufacturing and operation of flexible pipes there exists large knowledge and 
technology gaps that need to be filled to meet integrity requirements. The lack of knowledge and 
appropriate technology has been the direct cause for a number of flexible pipes to be taken out of 
operation before their service life has ended. This is partially caused of undetected defects or too 
conservative remaining life predictions. 
To mitigate the risk of failure and extend the service life of flexible pipe the industry has to 
cooperate. In recent years some initiatives have started and are leading the way for the industry to 
follow. 
In 2009 Oil and Gas UK started a Joint Industry Project (JIP) funded by international oil and gas 
operators. The JIP was led by SureFlex and included international oil and gas operators, a flexible 
pipe manufacturer and a regulatory authority (ref. [19]). A key objective for this project was to collect 
data from international oil and gas companies regarding flexible pipe use, degradation, and incidents.  
In recent years the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) has motivated for focus on flexible 
pipeline integrity. They manage the database COrrosion and DAMage (CODAM) for reporting injuries 
and incidents of offshore structures and pipeline systems on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). 
In addition to this, PSA publishes an annual report regarding trends in risk level in the petroleum 
activity (RNNP) for the NCS. In 2012 the report stressed the concern of integrity management for 
flexible pipes, and presented a list of improvement areas for the industry (ref. [9, 33]): 
“The industry needs to address the following improvement areas:  
1. Updating standards with the most recent experience.  
2. Integrity management of flexible risers with continuous monitoring and systems for 
documenting operations history, which are actively used in follow-up.  
3. Ensure good training and expertise throughout the organization responsible for following up 
integrity.  
4. Clear and unambiguous responsibilities for safe operation and integrity management.  
5. The industry must do a better job at sharing information between companies in order to 
ensure continuous improvement throughout the sector.  
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6. The industry must actively commit to research and development in order to increase 
knowledge about flexible risers.  
7. Quick and precise incident reporting associated with pipelines, risers and subsea facilities.”  
The two initiatives mentioned above are critical for the industry to progress in solving the integrity 
issues for flexible pipelines and risers. Information sharing is key to get an overview and to update 
standards and guidelines for safe fabrication and operation of flexible pipeline systems.  
1.2 Purpose of this thesis 
This thesis will have three main objectives: 
1. Present and describe the most probable failure modes for flexible pipes including 
occurrences and statistics.  
2. Present and describe conventional and new techniques for inspection and monitoring of 
flexible pipes. 
3. Propose an integrity management strategy for flexible pipes considering the information 
provided in the two previous objectives. 
By describing the failure modes with occurrence and statistics, the need for inspection and 
monitoring techniques will be established. The presentation of these techniques will serve as a 
screening of available integrity management tools within the industry. Conventional techniques are 
not sufficient to fulfil the integrity requirements, hence new technologies will be explored. Based on 
objective one and two an integrity management strategy will be proposed. The inspection and 
monitoring techniques will be allocated into categories, and the necessity of these techniques will be 
discussed. These objectives will serve as guidance for point one, two and six from PSA’s list for 
improvements regarding the flexible pipe area. 
1.3 Limitations 
This thesis will be limited to un-bonded flexible pipelines and risers. Hence bonded flexible pipes will 
not be discussed. Ancillary equipment, including spools and jumpers, will be mentioned but, not 
described in detail. The main focus will be directed on risers as these are the subject of the largest 
concern. Information on new technologies and failures on existing developments are limited due to 
competitive reasons. 
1.4 Methodology 
To establish an overview of the failure modes and mechanisms a literature study will be performed. 
Contact with PSA and the utilisation of their reports on this subject, in combination with industry 
standards, will give a basis for understanding the criticality of the different failure modes and 
mechanisms. Conference papers and contact with authors and experts will provide information 
regarding inspection and monitoring techniques. Through this process a list of stakeholders will be 
established and act as personal channels for information sharing and input on important issues. 
These inputs will provide different perspectives on the integrity management issue to broaden the 
understanding of the wider context. 
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2 Flexible pipelines and risers 
2.1 Introduction 
A flexible pipe is a complex configuration of different flexible layers (described in section 2.2) which 
act together as one unit for containment of produced oil and gas or injection of gas and water. The 
flexible pipeline and riser have the same pipe configuration. The flexible pipeline is installed on the 
seabed and is not subjected to large and frequent movements, hence it can be referred to as a static 
application. Flexible risers are the connection between seabed and production unit. The riser follow 
the motions of the production unit, hence it can be referred to as a dynamic application.  
The use of flexible pipelines has the potential to severely reduce the total installation cost compared 
to rigid pipeline installation. For rough seabed routes a rigid pipeline would require a large amount of 
seabed preparation, meaning renting and deployment of costly vessels and labour. An alternative is 
to find another route resulting in a longer pipeline, more material and fabrication cost and longer 
installation time. Another advantage of flexible pipeline is the change that may happen on the 
seabed over time. Currents can move the sand from beneath the pipeline creating free spans. This 
can cause problems for rigid pipelines and more seabed preparation may be needed. 
Flexible risers have been a revelation for floating production units. The dynamic motions of ships and 
semisubmersibles can be relatively large, and in harsh environments rigid pipelines can be 
unfeasible. Figure 1 shows an illustration of a semisubmersible, to the left, and a Floating Production, 
Storage and Offloading unit (FPSO), to the right, both connected to flexible risers. 
 
Figure 1 - Floating production units with flexible risers attached [sintef.no]. 
2.2 Layer description 
Flexible pipelines are complicated compounds made from different layers and materials, each with 
its specific function. The main components of a flexible pipeline are shown in Figure 2 and comprise: 
- internal carcass 
- internal pressure sheath 
- pressure armour wires 
- tensile armour wires  
- external pressure sheath 
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Operators can alter the configurations of their flexible pipes to achieve the properties they desire for 
each unique development. Examples include: adding layers to reinforce, adjusting the angle of 
armour wires to control the force distribution, vary materials for the operational environment and 
more. The different layers are described in the subsequent sections. 
 
Figure 2 – Example of a basic configuration of flexible pipes [28]. 
A section of the flexible pipe cross section that will be frequently discussed in this thesis is the 
annulus. The annulus is the free space between the internal pressure sheath and the outer sheath, 
e.g. the spacing between the steel wires. It is common practice to install a vent system for the 
annulus at the end fitting of the riser. This system includes tubes leading from the annulus to vent 
valves and is designed to release pressure and perform monitoring and testing of the annulus 
environment. 
2.2.1 Carcass 
The innermost layer of the flexible pipeline is called carcass. The carcass is composed of stainless 
steel strips in an interlocked profile (see Figure 3). The carcass has two main functions; prevent 
collapse due to hydrostatic pressure, and protect the other layers from contact with the produced 
fluids. The interlocked profile gives the carcass the ability to flex in addition to preventing the 
pipeline from collapsing. 
 
Figure 3 - Example of an interlocked carcass profile [2]. 
The dimensioning factor for the carcass is the expected hydrostatic. As the innermost layer the 
carcass acts as an abrasion cover for the rest of the layers so they don’t come in contact with the 
bore fluids. The produced fluids may contain solids with high erosion threat. This have to be 
considered and the steel type of the carcass must resist this force so that the pipe does not fail due 
to corrosion. 
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2.2.2 Internal pressure sheath 
The internal pressure sheath is an extruded polymer (plastic material) layer that is designed to keep 
the bore fluid integrity intact. The carcass is not leak proof, so the internal pressure sheath is 
required to prevent fluids from flowing freely into the pipe annulus. There are different materials 
with different benefits used for the internal pressure sheath. Table 1 lists the different polymer 
materials used in flexible pipes. For temperature limits, fluid compatibility and blistering 
characteristics see Appendix A. 
Layer Material type 
Internal pressure sheath HDPE, XLPE, PA, PVDF 
Intermediate (anti-collapse) sheaths HDPE, XLPE. PA. PVDF, TPE 
Anti-wear layers PA, PVDF, HDPE 
Outer sheath HDPE, PA, TPE 
Insulation PP, PVC, PU 
Table 1 - Different polymer materials used in flexible pipes [2]. 
The most commonly used polymers are HDPE and PA-11, as they have a greater strain resistance, 
lower cost, and there is a better understanding of how they react over time compared to the 
currently available other options.  
However, the materials used for the pressure sheath is permeable to low-molecular-weight 
hydrocarbons, meaning there is a continuous diffusion of gasses from the bore into the steel armour 
layers. This was not a known phenomenon in the early years of flexible pipe manufacturing, and has 
caused problems later on (this will be discussed in chapter three and four).  
2.2.3 Pressure armour 
The pressure armour (also known as the hoop stress armour) serves to withstand the internal radial 
pressure caused by the bore fluids and gases. This is an interlocked metallic layer wound by profiled 
wires (see Figure 4) with an angle close to 90°, installed around the internal pressure sheath. The 
profile of the wires and angle of winding allows for flexibility of the layer along with the mechanical 
strength. If the pipe is to be subjected to a very high internal pressure, a second armour layer may be 
installed. 
High strength carbon steel is commonly used in the pressure armour. The strength of the material 
used is based on design pressure and the “sourness” of the bore content. The sourness of the bore 
content is determined by the percentage of carbon dioxide (CO2) and hydrogen sulphide (H2S). Sweet 
and sour service is characterised by a low and high percentage of CO2 and H2S, respectively. For 
sweet service, high strength steel with Ultimate Tensile Strength (UTS) of 1400MPa can be used. High 
strength steel is prone to Hydrogen Induced Cracking (HIC) and Sulphide Stress Cracking (SSC) which 
is embrittlement of the steel caused by high values of H2S and CO2, respectively (further explained in 
section 3.7). Therefore sour service flexible pipes use steel wires with UTS as low as 750MPa. 
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Figure 4 - Examples of pressure armour profiles [2]. 
2.2.4 Tensile armour 
The tensile armour layer is designed to withstand the axial tension force in the pipe. Large tension 
forces are experienced by the pipeline during installation. The riser is under constant tension as it is 
suspended from the production facility down to the seabed. The tensile armour layer consists of 
several steel wires wound in a helical pattern around the pressure armour. The tensile armour is 
always installed in pair layers with opposing helical pattern to create torsional equilibrium in the 
pipe. Carbon steel is commonly used, and the UTS is governed by the same principals as for the 
pressure armour, i.e. HIC and SSC along with design forces. 
If large axial forces are expected additional layers of tensile armour can be installed. The steel wires 
are wound with an angle of 20-60 degrees from the longitudinal axis. Lower angles are used when 
the flexible pipe includes a pressure armour layer. If the internal pressure is estimated to be low 
there is no need for pressure armour. Then the angle is typically 55 degrees to balance the radial and 
longitudinal forces in the pipe.  
2.2.5 Outer sheath 
The external sheath can be made from the same extruded polymer material as the internal sheath 
(see Table 1), HDPE is often used. The outer sheath serves as an abrasion layer and keeps the 
seawater out of the annulus. This is a critical layer as outer sheath damage is the most common 
recorded failure mode (ref. [19]). 
2.2.6 Other layers 
The five layers discussed above are the main layers in a flexible pipe configuration. As mentioned 
there can be differences in these layers with regards to material selection, angle of winding, number 
of layers etc. To specify each individual flexible pipe for its own development conditions and 
purpose, there are also some other layers that can be added to the cross section. 
Anti-friction tape is a high strength tape that is wrapped around the steel layers to prevent wear 
when they are rubbing against each other in dynamic conditions (installation, vessel motion, 
environmental loads, etc.). High strength kevlar tape can be added to make sure that the wires keep 
their intended position and prevent wire buckling throughout the installation and operational stages.  
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For sour service developments with a high concentration of H2S a double annulus solution has been 
developed. In this concept the inner annulus contains the pressure armour which does not require 
high tensile strength steel, this allows for a relatively high H2S concentration. A second polymer 
sheath is wrapped around the pressure armour to make another “section” of the annulus where the 
tensile armour is located. Some H2S gas will be able to diffuse through this layer as well, but not as 
much as if there only was one polymer layer. This allows for higher tensile strength in the tensile 
armour without increasing the risk of SSC and HIC failures. 
For developments with cold water it is possible to install an insulation layer before the outer sheath. 
This layer will preserve the heat of the produced fluids for long distance pipelines. If the produced 
fluids are cooled down to a certain temperature the risk of hydrate and wax formation is increased. 
These formations can accumulate and block the pipeline, resulting in shut-down and potentially in 
costly repairs.  
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3 Failure mode review 
Because of the complex configuration of the flexible pipeline with many layers and different 
materials there are a great number of events that can cause failure of the pipeline. This chapter will 
discuss: 
- The failure modes that are listed in API RP 17B (ref. [2]) 
- Some of the mechanisms that may lead to these failure modes 
- Occurrence of the failure modes in terms of examples and statistics 
- Design solutions that can prevent the failure modes from happening 
A failure mode is typically caused by a succession of defects or degradation that leads to loss of 
integrity. Integrity loss is characterised by loss of containment, reduced production capability or 
increased risk for human lives, environment or other assets. A failure mechanism is a single defect or 
degradation that individually does not cause the pipe to fail. The complete list of potential failure 
mechanisms for static and dynamic applications listed in [2] is presented in Table 8 and 9 in Appendix 
B. 
The failure modes that will be discussed in this chapter are: 
1. Collapse 
2. Burst 
3. Tensile failure 
4. Compressive failure 
5. Overbending 
6. Torsional failure 
7. Fatigue failure 
8. Erosion 
9. Corrosion 
3.1 Collapse 
Collapse of a flexible pipeline is when the pressure sheath and/or carcass fail by collapsing inwards to 
cause severe problems for flow assurance and integrity. The failure mechanisms that may lead to 
collapse are different, but the common denominators are excessive force or pressure, fabrication 
anomalies, erosion, corrosion of carcass and transport and installation damage.  
Failure mechanisms 
Collapse can be caused by excessive tension of the tensile armour wires. The weight of a flexible riser 
is relatively large; hence the tensile load near the hag-off point on the riser is large, especially for 
deep water developments. The tension causes the tensile wires to tighten, due to the helical pattern, 
and transforms the tension into compression on the layers within and can cause collapse of the 
carcass. Dynamic vessels and environmental forces will add to total tension force.  
Collapse due to excessive external pressure may have different causes. Deepwater installations 
experience large hydrostatic pressure, and if not constructed correctly this may contribute to the 
collapse. Example of manufacturing defects is high initial ovality and high radial gap between 
pressure armour and internal pressure sheath. Under operation gasses will diffuse through the 
carcass and internal pressure sheath into the annulus. If the venting system is not working as 
designed, due to flattened or blocked vent tubes, a residual pressure will build inside the annulus and 
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may cause the collapse. The most common reason for collapse in the cases of trapped gas in the 
annulus is when the pipe is subjected to rapid pressure release. The speed of the depressurization 
causes the pipe to be unable to stabilise the pressure so the residual stress in the annulus cause the 
carcass and/or internal pressure sheath to collapse. 
Recent carcass collapse failures have shown that high pressure pipes with extra pressure polymer 
sheaths may cause diffused gas to be permanently or temporarily trapped between the layers and 
cause large radial inwards pressure high enough to cause collapse (ref. [24]). Shrinking of the 
polymer layers combined with self-weight is also known to cause carcass collapse. 
Transportation and installation is a critical phase for every flexible pipe. With regards to collapse the 
greatest dangers are dropped objects, collisions and other unexpected forces that might cause 
ovalisation, overbending and excessive tension of the pipe. 
For production pipes there is a risk of sand in the produced fluids. Especially for gas production pipes 
this may cause erosion on the inside of the carcass. This will in some places reduce the wall thickness 
and also lead to local corrosion. Thinning of the carcass wall reduces the collapse resistance. 
Occurrence 
The collected CODAM data presented in Table 3 shows that collapse is the most common reported 
incident for the NCS. In later years it has been discovered that collapse is especially threatening for 
double annulus risers. Statoil has had several incidents with flexible risers designed with this 
configuration. Problems with carcass collapse in flexible risers at Njord A, Visund and Snorre B is 
described in [21]. This investigation report reveals leakages during shut down activity in three 
different risers at three different location, all of the with the same double annulus configuration. 
Figure 5 presents an incident where the carcass has collapsed. 
 
Figure 5 - Carcass collapse [21]. 
A failure in a flexible water injection riser with a smooth bore was experienced on the Draugen field 
in January 2000 (ref. [25]). The flexible riser was installed in a nitrogen pressurised J-tube. Nitrogen 
diffused through the outer sheath and into the pipe annulus. At some occasions the pressure in the 
top of the riser became so low that it acted as a vacuum and the pressure difference in the bore and 
annulus exceeded the collapse pressure. This caused the inner sheath to collapse. When reapplying 
pressure to the bore the inner sheath was “blown up” again and the injected water could flow freely. 
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This happened several times until the inner pressure sheath cracked and pressurised water filled the 
annulus. Tension wires were then subjected to the full hoop stress and started failing. When the 
outer layers failed they slide down inside the J-tube causing the internal pressure sheath to fail 
immediately and in the end also the pressure armour after substantial uncoiling. 
Design solution 
Increasing the thickness of the pressure armour will improve the resistance against the external 
hydrostatic pressure. Increasing the thickness and strength of the internal pressure sheath and/or 
carcass will improve the resistance against residual pressure in the annulus.  
Increasing the thickness of the different layers may have limited effect if the transportation and 
installation loads are large enough to damage the pipe. Modification of transportation routines or 
installation procedures could reduce the number of failures, not only collapse, but also damage of 
the outer sheath. 
3.2 Burst 
Opposite of collapse, burst is caused by internal pressure or excessive forces and the materials will 
rupture outwards.  
Failure mechanisms 
Two potential failure mechanisms leading to burst is rupture of tensile or pressure armour due to 
excessive internal pressure. These failures may be caused by fault in engineering or fabrication of the 
pipe, fault in pressure integrity modules upstream in the system and operating above design limits.  
Rupture of the external sheath is also failure mechanism that may lead to loss of pipe integrity. 
Diffused gasses in the annulus can cause pressure build up large enough to rupture the external 
sheath if the venting system is not working properly. 
The probability of burst is largely increased by anomalies in the flexible pipe layers. Fabrication 
errors, internal corrosion and erosion or external abrasion will decrease the burst resistance and 
create weak spots. 
Occurrence 
The CODAM database includes several reported burst incidents of flexible risers. Figure 6 shows an 
example of burst of the external sheath near the end fitting. In this case there was a leak across the 
main seal inside the end fitting. This leak caused the pressure to build up inside the annulus leading 
to a rupture of the external sheath (ref. [11]).  
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Figure 6 - Rupture of external sheath due to leak in end fitting [11]. 
Figure 7 shows the rupture of the external sheath in a flexible riser where the annulus vent system is 
blocked or not functioning correctly. The diffused gas from the bore fluid will over time increase the 
pressure until it is larger than the burst resistance of the external sheath. This is however a well-
known problem and large focus has in the later years been directed to a well-functioning vent system 
and vent gas monitoring. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Rupture of external sheath due to blocked vent tubes [1]. 
Design solutions 
Also for burst failure mechanisms a design solution is to increase the thickness of the pressure 
armour or external sheath. Another solution is to increase the material strength if feasible.  
Design modification can dictate the distribution of force in the different layers. Angle of the tensile 
and pressure armour, shape of the wires and also installation angle of the pipeline are things that can 
prevent burst from occurring. 
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Adding more armour layers will obviously increase the burst resistance, but will also increase the size 
and weight of the pipe. If this is a deepwater riser the tension loads may be too large to make this 
solution feasible. 
3.3 Tensile failure 
Tension forces are mainly a riser problem as it hangs from the platform and all of the weight is 
distributed to the top of the riser. But also static flowlines can be subjected to excessive tensile 
forces due to snagging by fishing trawl or ship anchors. 
Failure mechanisms 
Excessive tensile forces may cause rupture in the tensile armour. The tensile armour wires are 
designed to withstand loads well above the normal service loads, but in case of corrosion, fabrication 
anomalies or other factors the resistance may be reduced.  
As the tensile wires are configured in a helical pattern tensile force will tighten the wires and act as 
compression on the layers within. This may lead to collapse of the carcass and/or internal pressure 
sheath. 
Snagging of the pipe can also cause overbending in the pipe. This may lead to rupture of tension 
armour or buckling of the pipeline. 
Occurrence 
Tensile failure is not one of the most threatening failure modes due to the high fatigue safety factor 
and focus from the start of the flexible pipe era. In the presented incident reports from CODAM 
(Table 3) and SureFlex (Table 4) tensile failure represents a low percentage of occurrences. However 
tensile failure has occurred in flexible risers in Brazil due to high tensile loads combined with 
corrosion or fatigue (ref. [1]). In other words, failure due to tension may happen if other factors like 
corrosion, abrasion, collision, anomalies etc. alter the tensile resistance of the flexible pipeline. The 
deep water developments in the Gulf of Mexico (GoM), Brazil and West Africa make these fields 
more applicable to tensile failure due to the high axial loads of the riser itself. 
  
Figure 8 - Tensile armour wire rupture due to abrasion [14]. 
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Figure 8 shows how abrasion can wear down the external sheath and some of the tensile wires 
risking the entire pipeline to rupture. Figure 9 is an example of how tensile wires can rupture due to 
fatigue, this time near the end fitting. 
 
Figure 9 - Tensile armour wire rupture due to fatigue [14]. 
Design solutions 
To prevent tensile failure it is advised to increase the thickness of the tensile armour wires or select a 
higher strength material if feasible. Modifying the wire angle alters the force distribution and can 
contribute to better tension resistance. Modifying the installation angle and pipeline route can 
decrease the tension force. Ultimately adding more tension armour layers should be considered. 
Another solution is to bury the pipeline. This will protect the pipe from snagging by fishing trawls and 
ship anchors. 
For risers the riser configuration (see Figure 10) can reduce the tensile load experienced in the hang 
off point. By installing floaters at a point on the riser to create a lazy wave configuration some of the 
tension is relieved for the hang-off point and distributed to the arch over the floating buoy. This is 
more common for deep water installations than for shallow water as the tensile loads here are 
significantly larger. 
 
Figure 10 - Example of flexible riser configurations [2]. 
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3.4 Compressive failure 
When a pipeline is installed the temperature of the pipeline materials are equalised with the 
temperature of the ambient water. After starting production, warm gas and fluids conveyed in the 
pipeline raises the temperature. This causes the materials in the pipeline to expand and if it is 
restricted by friction or constrained ends compression forces will build and may cause buckling and 
overbending. 
Failure mechanisms 
An experienced failure mechanism in static flowlines is radial buckling, also known as bird-caging. 
This phenomenon occurs when the compressive loads are large enough to cause wire disordering. 
Usually the external pressure acting on the outer sheath is enough to prevent radial buckling to 
occur, but when the outer sheath is damaged the buckling resistance is severely reduced. This is 
however not a common failure in newer because of the use of high strength kevlar tapes used 
around the armour wire layers to prevent failures like birdcaging from happening.  
Excessive compression force may also lead to upheaval buckling. Upheaval buckling is when 
compression forces press the pipeline towards a restricted end. When it is not allowed to move the 
pipeline arches upwards creating bending stress. 
Occurrence 
From SureFlex’ incident report we see that birdcaging is a failure to be aware of, with 5% of the 
reported incidents worldwide (2010) being categorised as bird caging. Also overbending and 
upheaval buckling are represented on the incident chart, both being a result of compressive forces 
(among other reasons). Figure 11 shows a small example of birdcaging. 
 
Figure 11 - Example of birdcaging [23]. 
Design solutions 
To avoid bird-caging there are strengthening tapes developed for giving the tensile armour layer 
support and restricting them from buckling outwards. Also thicker outer sheath will serve somewhat 
of the same purpose. 
15 
 
However the best solution is to avoid these large forces if it is possible. Selecting a riser configuration 
that does not cause restrictions, adding spools or pipeline bends to safely guide the pipeline 
expansion and burying the pipeline are ways to avoid large compressive forces. 
3.5 Overbending 
Overbending is a threat especially for risers in at the touch-down point (TDP) and for flowlines as a 
result of buckling. Bending of a pipe cause compression on one side and tension at the other that 
may lead to collapse or rupture. Overbending can also be a result of trawler or anchor snagging. 
Failure mechanisms 
For the carcass and internal pressure sheath overbending can cause collapse due to the compression 
force and also ovalisation that reduces the collapse resistance. It can also be the reason for rupture 
of the internal or external pressure sheath as result of the tension forces. 
Large bending forces may lead to unlocking of the interlocked layers (carcass and pressure armour) 
of the flexible pipe. This will reduce the collapse resistance of the carcass and also the pressure and 
tension resistance of both the carcass and the pressure armour. 
The outer sheath can suffer cracking if the bending stress is large enough. 
Occurrence 
There has only been one reported incident regarding overbending in the Norwegian sector. This 
happened during installation over an arch in shallow water. Other incidents may have happened, but 
if the production has not started when the incident happens it has probably not been reported. It is 
known that the UK sector had several incidents during installation in the 90’s, of which both 
overbending and birdcaging occurred. This was mostly due to poor equipment and procedures, 
reasons that are easy to correct. 
Design solutions 
Modifying the design of the flexible pipe, adding armour layers and alternating the pipeline route can 
prevent overbending. Rock dumping and burial of the pipeline can prevent buckling that could have 
led to overbending. 
3.6 Torsional failure 
As flexible risers are used for floating production systems they are in constant motion due to wind, 
waves and currents. This will sometimes cause torsion loads in the riser that may lead to a failure 
mode. 
Failure mechanisms 
As the tensile armour wires are configured in a helical pattern they are subjected to tension or 
compression as the riser is twisted. Excessive tension loads due to twisting may lead to rupture of 
one or several wires. 
Torsional force in either direction on the flexible pipe may cause problems. If the force is in the same 
direction as the helical pattern of the wires, they will tighten and collapse of the carcass and/or 
internal pressure sheath may occur. If the torsional force acts in the other direction the wires may be 
subjected to excessive compression force causing radial buckling or unlocking of the armour wires. 
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Torsional force can also be caused by rupture of tensile armour wires. If a number of wires were to 
rupture the entire riser will twist to restore equilibrium (see Figure 12). The torsional force created to 
restore equilibrium may cause rupture of internal or external pressure sheath, or increase 
compressive force risking collapse of carcass and/or internal pressure sheath.  
 
Figure 12 - Torsion at the top of a riser due to ruptured armour wires [14]. 
Occurrence 
Torsional failure is not regarded as a large threat, and it is not an incident that is often reported. 
However it may contribute to other failures and one must be aware of the possibility for torsional 
failure. 
Design solutions 
Torsional loads can be reduced by modifying the system design. By modifying the cross sectional 
design the torsional capacity can be improved. Altering the wire lay angle, adding armour layers or 
strengthening tape around the armour layers are recommended solutions to improve torsional 
capacity. 
3.7 Fatigue failure 
In service the different layers of the flexible pipe will be subjected to several different stresses. This 
can be tension, compression, torsion, erosion, corrosion and temperature variations. A single load 
cycle of the mentioned stresses may not be large enough to damage the pipe, but the accumulated 
cycles can wear down the different layers. 
Failure mechanisms 
A known difficulty (especially in deep water developments) is the fatigue failure of tension wires near 
the end connection. Tension wires are designed to endure much higher loads than they are subjected 
to, but over time the tensile stress due to environmental forces will accumulate and fatigue wire 
rupture may occur. 
Damage to the outer sheath is a well-known problem and is one of the most occurring defects that 
may lead to pipe failure. Abrasion against bell mouth, I-tube or bend restrictor, interfacing 
structures, other pipelines and the seabed at the TDP may lead to damage and seawater ingress. The 
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flooded annulus creates an environment that can rapidly decrease the service life of the flexible pipe 
due to corrosion of the tensile and pressure armour wires and degradation of the polymer layers, 
thus increasing fatigue damage. 
The polymer layers of the pipe can also experience failure due to time dependant stresses. 
Temperature cycles and flooded annulus may cause the polymeric layers to crack due to 
embrittlement (described in section 4.1). 
Friction forces between the different layers add to the “wear and tear” and can increase the total 
fatigue loading. 
Two chemical reactions within the flexible pipeline that may severely reduce the service life are SSC 
and HIC. SSC is when the pipeline operates with a sour service environment, e.g. there is a relatively 
large amount of H2S in the produced fluids. The H2S reacts with the steel layers if they are not rated 
for sour service operation. The reaction will cause embrittlement of the steel which reduces the 
cracking resistance of the material. HIC is a phenomenon that occurs when atomic hydrogen is 
discharged and diffuses into the metal to cause embrittlement. The discharging of atomic hydrogen 
happens in the vicinity of the sacrificial anodes in the cathodic protection system. Corrosion Resistant 
Alloy (CRA) materials is the most susceptible to the atomic hydrogen and therefor also in greater risk 
of HIC. 
Occurrence 
Fatigue failure is a complicated subject, and numerous tests and calculation models have been 
developed to estimate the fatigue life of the armour wires, aging of the polymeric sheaths, corrosion 
and erosion rate of the carcass or tensile wires etc. With this intense focus on fatigue and a 
recommended safety factor of 10 on fatigue life the failures are decreasing. In Norway there has not 
been a fatigue failure of tensile wires (ref. [1]). In Brazil and West Africa however there have been 
some incidents due to fatigue failure in tensile armour, but this is generally caused after corrosion or 
sour service has severely decreased the fatigue life of the wires (ref. [1]). 
Fatigue failure may as discussed be rare without any other influencing factors. Another of these 
factors is fabrication faults. One example is explained in [1] where the carcass is fabricated so that 
the interlocked steel strips are unable to slide when they are fully expanded or compressed causing 
an unintended force distribution and fatigue damage to the carcass. This kind of fatigue failure may 
be one of a kind, but it can categorise as fabrication faults which is a critical category for most 
failures. 
Design solutions 
To mitigate the risk of fatigue failure it is recommended that the system is designed to minimise the 
fatigue loads. Optimizing the floater movement in the water (mooring or Dynamic Positioning (DP) 
system), install bend stiffeners to reduce the bending loads near the riser hang off; optimise the riser 
configuration (lazy wave, catenary, etc.) to minimise loads and movement of the riser.  
Reassess the materials used and the thickness and configurations of these materials to ensure they 
can cope with the loads, fluids and temperatures they will be subjected to. Many new failure 
mechanisms and operating conditions have been learned since the first flexible risers were installed. 
This has to be incorporated into the new design of flexible pipes. 
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Material selection is important to prevent SSC and HIC from happening. Use steel that is rated for the 
expected sourness of the produced fluids, and be aware that the sourness can change over time. 
3.8 Erosion 
Erosion in flexible pipelines is when particles in the produced fluids collide with the internal wall of 
the carcass and over time causes thinning of the steel layer.  
Failure mechanisms 
When solids (sand) are produced and conveyed through a production pipeline erosion can be a 
problem. Especially for gas production the solid fragments have high velocity and collide with the 
inner wall off the carcass. Some areas will be more endangered by this problem as the lay route of 
the pipe cause certain areas to experience more erosion than others (bends and curves). 
Development of hydrates in the flexible pipeline may also cause erosion problems as this may 
develop into solid material (ice) that can cause erosion if it is broken loose and transported along the 
pipe.  
Erosion alone does not usually cause failure of the pipe, but the erosion process wears down the 
corrosion protecting layer of the internal carcass wall. If erosion and corrosion act together the 
thinning of the carcass may be sufficient enough to cause collapse or rupture. Figure 13 shows an 
example of internal erosion of a carcass. 
 
Figure 13 - Internal erosion of carcass [1]. 
Occurrence 
There has not been reported any flexible pipeline failures due to erosion alone. The highest risk for 
serious erosion is for gas production lines when sand is produced with the high velocity gas. 
Design solution 
A good estimation of the sand content of the production volume is essential to the design of the 
carcass layer. Increased wall thickness or optimised material selection can increase the erosion 
resistance. 
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To reduce the sand content of the produced fluids would be the best solution to this problem. This is 
often ensured by a filter in the well near the reservoir. 
Optimising the lay route of the pipeline will ensure better flow of the production fluid and decrease 
the critical areas for erosion. 
3.9 Corrosion 
Corrosion of the steel layers is caused by a chemical reaction in the material. This gradually destroys 
the material and reduces resistance and fatigue life. A typical reason for corrosion in pipelines is 
when seawater saturated with oxygen comes in contact with the steel layers to induce oxidation. 
Corrosion is not by itself a normal cause to pipe failure, but together with high loadings or fatigue 
loads this is a serious threat of integrity. Figure 14 shows two different cases of corrosion of the 
tensile armour wires. Figure 14 a) and b) presents a fully corroded single tensile armour wire, while c) 
presents local corrosion on multiple tensile armour wires. 
 
Figure 14 - Corroded tensile armour wires due to breach of outer sheath [1]. 
Failure mechanisms 
If the corrosion protection on the internal wall of the carcass has eroded away, there might be 
internal corrosion of the carcass. 
Tensile or pressure armour wires are threatened by corrosion both from produced fluids diffusing 
through the internal pressure sheath, and seawater ingress due to a damaged outer pressure sheath. 
The greatest integrity risk has been experienced to be near the splash zone near the top end of the 
riser. If the outer sheath is damaged here causing seawater to flood the annulus oxygen will be 
continuously supplied and the corrosion process will be rapid compared to if the same happened 
some distance under water. The top section of the riser is not protected by the cathodic protection 
system (corrosion protection). Corrosion in the tensile and armour wires will reduce their material 
capacities and hence reduce the fatigue life and system integrity. 
Occurrence 
The most frequent cause of corrosion is when there is a breach of the outer sheath and seawater and 
oxygen is allowed to flow into the annulus. A great deal of the incidents leading to breach of the 
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outer layer is related to transportation or installation of the flexible pipeline where undiscovered 
damages are not repaired, and abrasion due to contact with ancillary equipment. All the latest 
statistics reveals this problem hence it is reason to believe that this is of high concern and that the 
occurrence of this type of failure will decrease in the coming years. Especially the transportation and 
installation process can be improved, and should not cause a threat to the integrity. 
Design solutions 
To improve corrosion resistance increased layer thickness and critical material selection is advised. 
By adding coatings and/or lubricants the surface of the steel layers will have larger “scratch” 
resistance hindering local corrosion attacks. Coating on the outer sheath will protect against 
abrasion. Lubrication in the annulus protects the armour wires from frictional damage. 
Cathodic protection is a normal technique used for preventing corrosion in pipelines. This is achieved 
by installing sacrificial anodes of a metal that corrodes instead of the pipeline. These anodes need to 
be periodically replaced. 
3.10 Summary of failure modes 
Table 4 gives a summary of the failure modes listed and described in this chapter. The table includes 
a brief description of failure mechanisms, occurrence and design solution for each failure mode. 
# Failure mode Failure mechanisms Occurrence Design solutions 
1 Collapse 
Excessive tension Large problem, multiple reports 
both in CODAM and SureFlex JIP. 
Problem worldwide 
Increased thickness of pressure 
armour/carcass 
External pressure Increased thickness and 
strength of internal pressure 
sheath 
Residual pressure in annulus 
Fabrication, transportation, 
installation error 
QA/QC in fabrication, 
transportation and installation 
Aging of polymer (shrinking) 
Ovalisation 
2 Burst 
Rupture of tensile armour wires Burst of the outer sheath is a 
common problem. Rupture of 
tensile wires may be a problem 
for deepwater developments. 
Increase thickness of tensile 
armour wires 
Rupture of pressure armour wires Increase thickness of pressure 
armour wires 
Residual pressure in annulus Alter design configuration 
3 Tensile failure 
Excessive tensile force Not a frequent failure mode. 
High risk for corroded wires in 
deep water developments 
Increase thickness of tensile 
armour wires 
Large dynamic movement Material selection 
Corrosion combined with high 
tensile loads 
Alter design configuration 
Riser configuration 
Bury pipeline 
4 
Compressive 
failure 
Radial buckling Radial buckling (birdcaging) has 
been reported several times 
worldwide 
Add strengthening tapes 
Upheaval buckling Increase thickness of outer 
sheath 
Riser and pipeline 
configuration 
Bury pipeline 
5 Overbending 
Excessive bending force Problem at end of pipelines and 
TDP for risers. Several 
occurrences due to sloppiness in 
the 90's 
Riser and pipeline 
configuration 
Installation error Bury pipeline 
Ancillary equipment  Alter design configuration 
6 
Torsional 
failure 
Large dynamic movement Not a frequent failure mode. 
Risers in harsh weather 
conditions are most vulnerable 
Riser configuration 
Large environmental forces Alter design configuration 
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# Failure mode Failure mechanisms Occurrence Design solutions 
Rupture of tensile armour wires Adding strengthening tape or 
armour layers 
7 Fatigue failure 
Rupture of tensile armour wires Fatigue alone is not the most 
occurring failure mode due to a 
very high safety factor. In 
combination with erosion, 
corrosion and other factors the 
fatigue life is severely reduced. 
Riser and pipeline 
configuration 
Rupture of pressure armour wires Material selection 
Aging of polymer layers QA/QC in fabrication, 
transportation and installation 
Cracking of carcass or armour wires 
8 Erosion 
Internal erosion of carcass No reported failures. Risk when 
sand bore fluids contain sand, 
especially in high velocity gas 
pipelines 
Limit sand production 
Increase carcass thickness 
Pipeline route configuration 
9 Corrosion 
Rupture of tensile armour wires Large problem linked to the 
frequent damage of outer 
sheath.  
Increase steel layer thickness 
Rupture of pressure armour wires Add coatings or lubricants 
Corrosion of internal carcass Material selection 
Cathodic protection 
Table 2 - Failure mode summary 
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4 Failure mechanisms 
In addition to the failure modes described in chapter three, there are some common failure 
mechanisms that should be explained further to get a clear overview of the risks involved with 
operation of flexible pipelines. This chapter includes typical failure mechanisms for the polymer 
sheaths, how the annulus environment can cause degradation to different layers and failures that 
can happen in the end fittings. 
4.1 Polymer related failures 
The use of polymer sheaths in flexible pipelines is one of the elements that make this technology 
possible. Without these materials the pipeline would not be able to contain the produced 
hydrocarbons or keep the seawater out of the pipe annulus. However the materials used have very 
different properties compared to steel. One of the consequences of the different properties is the 
increase or decrease in volume. For example the expansion coefficient for some polymer materials 
are more than 10 times higher than steel. For rapid cool down of pipelines, i.e. installation and shut-
down scenarios, this causes the polymer sheaths to reduce in volume much faster than steel. This 
can result in large stresses in the pressure sheath that can cause cracks or transfer the loads to the 
carcass, and in worst case cause carcass collapse or end fitting pull-out. 
 
Figure 15 – Example of internal pressure sheath cracking [1]. 
To give the polymer layers its flexibility they contain an additive called plasticiser. When in contact 
with production fluids this additive will migrate out of the polymeric sheath causing it to reduce in 
volume and become more brittle. Figure 15 shows the cracking of the internal pressure sheath. 
Figure 16 shows cracking of the outer sheath. 
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Figure 16 – Example of outer sheath cracking [1]. 
Time dependant degradation is a frequent problem for the polymer layers. Exposure to water and 
high temperature can cause hydrolysis which alters the molecular build-up of the polymer inducing 
embrittlement and cracking. Temperature variations can threaten the polymer layers. Especially in 
constrained areas like bend stiffeners, buoyancy elements and buried sections of the pipeline where 
the temperature can reach above design limits. Anti-friction tapes and high strength pressure tapes 
are made from polyamides that degrade at high temperatures. These layers can suffer from 
embrittlement and disintegrate causing blocked annulus vent tubes, but also soften and increase the 
friction between steel layers and accelerate fatigue.            
 Design solutions 
Temperature management is of paramount importance regarding polymer layers. Gradually shut-
downs and start up with focus on slow thermal changes is advised. Beware of chemical processes and 
choose the polymer material that is best suited for the operational environment for each 
development. 
4.2 Annulus environment 
As the reported failures from CODAM and SureFlex shows annulus environment represents a large 
portion of failures of flexible risers. When flexible pipes first was fabricated and installed it was a 
common belief that the annulus would stay dry as long as the outer sheath was intact. With this 
assumption the fatigue life was calculated for dry environment. After years of operation it was 
realised that water and gas could diffuse through the internal pressure sheath and condense inside 
the annulus. The condensed water fills up the annulus and degradation mechanisms act on both steel 
and plastic layers. It was also discovered that the outer sheath was relatively often damaged causing 
the annulus to fill up with water and/or air, also increasing the degradation of materials. The fatigue 
life of the different layers is reduced and pipelines and risers must be replaced before their expected 
service life is over. Polymer failures due to exposure to water, gas and air has been discussed in 
section 4.1 with the most critical failures of cracking, end fitting pull-out and collapsed carcass. 
Corrosion of the armour wires is a severe consequence of flooded annulus. Seawater ingress, 
diffused H2S and CO2 are causes for corrosion of the armour wires, however there is a large 
knowledge gap regarding how corrosion acts and how severe the individual cases of corrosion is. The 
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corrosion rate of steel wires, the location of outer sheath breach, composition of diffused gases, and 
the combination of this are factors that need more research to be fully understood. Pipelines and 
risers have been in operation for several years with damaged outer sheath and flooded annulus 
without any serious degradation of the flexible pipe layers.  
Design solutions 
The best way to limit the failures caused by annulus environment is QA/QC of fabrication and 
installation and early detection of external breach. Also monitoring vent gases from the annulus and 
examining gas samples. Early detection will give the operators time to repair or plan mitigating 
measures. 
Procedures have been developed for re-establishing blocked vent systems, by drilling new vent ports 
through end fitting, epoxy filling port or the external sheath (ref. [24]). 
4.3 End fittings 
The end fitting is a complicated part of the flexible pipeline system. This is the connection point 
between the pipeline to a subsea module or riser to a production facility. The end fittings comprise 
the termination of all the layers in a flexible pipe, and needs to seal off each layer to prevent leakage 
into the annulus or out to the environment. Example of an end fitting configuration is presented in 
Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17 - Example of end fitting configuration [2]. 
There are a number of failure mechanisms that can happen in the end fitting. Carcass and pressure 
sheath pull-out are discussed in the section of polymer related failures. In addition there is an arising 
problem with the termination of the tensile armour wires for deep water risers where high tension 
loads create challenges. Also the vent tubes for the annulus vent system are normally installed 
through the end fittings. These tubes may be blocked in fabrication due to overbending, and also 
from particles from dissolved polymer layers. Leakage through the sealing inside the end fitting is a 
reported problem that can cause annulus flooding or leakage to the environment. 
Design solutions 
QA/QC in design and fabrication is important to assure the integrity of the end fittings.  
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5 Reported failures 
Reporting of failures is an important process for further learning and information sharing between 
manufacturers and operating companies. By sharing failure experiences future failures can be 
avoided and technology improvement can advance faster. This chapter will present reported failures 
from two sources; the CODAM database for failure reporting on the NCS and the results from a JIP 
lead by SureFlex including a number of international operating companies. 
 
Table 3 - Reported failure of flexible risers in the Norwegian Continental Shelf (1995 – 2014). Source: CODAM, Ref. 
Appendix C. 
Table 3 presents the reported failures of flexible risers in the NCS from 1995 to 2014. The data is 
provided by the CODAM database which is managed by PSA - Norway. The data used is listed in 
Appendix C. There may be some discussion about how the failures are categorised. In this table 
collapse and burst are treated as different categories although blocked or malfunctioning annulus 
vent system may lead to both these failures. Also abrasion and water filled annulus could be in the 
same category, but some of the reported failures do not coincide. It should be noted that the data in 
CODAM is not always conclusive and some assumptions has been made. The category “other” 
includes: micro leakage, hydrate plug, lacking end termination plug, dropped object, pigging and 
disconnected anchor wire for mid water arch. A large part of this chart is named unknown. This may 
partly be because the reporting is insufficient from the operators, but also the fact that flexible 
pipeline integrity still is not 100% understood. 
An obvious observation from table one is that collapse, abrasion, water filled annulus and burst is the 
most common failure modes. A significant number of these failures happened due to blockage, 
failure or faulty operation of the annulus vent system. As discussed in the failure modes, 
overpressure in the annulus can cause both burst and collapse. Abrasion refers mainly to breach of 
the external sheath, and it is known that poor procedures and management of the fabrication and 
installation process in the early years of flexible pipelines are to blame. The positive note is that 
these failure modes are well known, and relatively easy to do something about. QA and QC 
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throughout fabrication, storage, transportation, installation and operation should be of paramount 
interest for the operators when we see the outcome of “sloppiness”. 
 
 
Table 4 - Reported failure of flexible risers in Norway, UK and worldwide [19]. 
Table 4 gives an overview of reported failures of flexible risers worldwide and is a result of a JIP lead 
by SureFlex (ref. [19]). This table is based on reports from different institutes as well as information 
provided from several operators worldwide through surveys. The table is included in this thesis to 
give an overview of failures not only in Norway, but also worldwide. From this table we see that 
external sheath damage and annulus vent system anomalies are common failures also worldwide. 
We also see that for the combined reporting from Norway and UK polymer aging and pull-out 
represent a large percentage of the total failures. This may be caused by different reporting 
processes, and more available data than for table 3, but indicates that these failures are common. 
However the percentage of the failures is allocated, all of them should be of concern and preventive 
measures should be taken. The category “other” includes: smooth bore collapse, pigging damage, 
upheaval buckling, excess torsion, excess tension, sheath cracking and armour wire failure. 
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6 Inspection techniques 
In order to inspect the flexible pipes there are developed several inspection techniques for detecting 
failures and degradations. An inspection is a time constrained event that is planned with a beginning 
and an end. Some inspection techniques require deployment of vessels and equipment with experts 
analysing the results. This chapter will explain both conventional techniques that are used today as 
well as new techniques that are under development. The techniques will be presented with 
theoretical background, offshore application and development status. 
The inspection techniques that will be described in this chapter are: 
1. Conventional inspection techniques 
a. Visual inspection 
b. Annulus pressure testing 
c. Laser leak detection 
d. Coupon testing 
2. New inspection techniques 
a. Radiography 
b. Ultrasonic testing 
c. Eddy current 
d. Magnetic stress measurement 
6.1 Conventional inspection techniques 
6.1.1 Visual inspection 
An inevitable method for inspecting pipelines and risers is visual inspection. The most general 
inspection method is the manual deck visual inspection to check for obvious anomalies. Using divers 
for shallow water inspection, Remotely Operated underwater Vehicle (ROV) mounted cameras for 
shallow and deep water and climbers for the above water part of the riser will give a good 
opportunity for close or general visual inspection.  
Visual inspection should seek to identify the following potential problems (ref. [2]): 
1. Extent and type of marine growth  
2. Pipe general integrity and condition, including leaks  
3. Pipe outer sheath or external carcass integrity and condition  
4. Debris and dropped objects  
5. Evidence of scour and estimated length of free spans  
6. Condition of end fittings  
7. Condition of cathodic protection system  
8. Any identifiable damage, distortion, or degradation  
9. Any identifiable disarrangement of pipe and disarrangement or loss of pipe ancillary components  
10. Interference with other subsea hardware  
11. Loops and kinks  
12. Movement or displacement from “as installed” conditions  
13. Corrosion of and accumulation of marine growth in vent valves  
External general visual inspection 
The external visual inspection is performed mainly to investigate the integrity of the outer sheath. It 
is well known that from the hang off point of the riser and down to about 30m below sea level is the 
most critical area for damaging of the outer sheath. Where the riser is open (not inside bend 
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restrictor or I-tube) regular intervals of visual inspection using ROV or divers subsea or climbers 
above sea level is common practice. For inspection and survey of static flexible flowlines it is 
common to deploy ROV’s. There is however other solutions like Autonomous Underwater Vehicles 
(AUV) that can sit on the seabed for months and automatically inspect the pipeline. [30] Explains the 
operating principle and possible applications for their IMR AUV. The AUV has a “base” subsea that is 
connected to the host facility where it recharges between the surveys. Here it can be manually 
programmed to do a survey. When deploying the AUV automatically performs the inspection or light 
intervention tasks, returns to base and uploads the video and data to a computer on the host facility. 
This technology could potentially be a good alternative to ROV’s. AUV’s has not been used for 
pipeline inspection, but has the potential of carrying out this type of work in the future. 
External close visual inspection 
If monitoring or inspection results raises the question of pipe integrity, closer visual inspections of 
the threatened area is performed in addition to the planned inspection interval.  
Internal visual inspection 
For inspecting the outer sheath in the closed area of an I-tube it is necessary to insert a camera inside 
the I-tube. The camera that has to be approved for operating in an explosive environment is lowered 
down through an inspection window from deck level to examine the flexible riser. This technique also 
checks the bend stiffener fixation and the presence of debris inside the I-tube that may damage the 
riser (ref. [14]). Internal visual inspection of the carcass is also possible with the use of camera 
through an inspection window. This method searches the carcass for collapse, ovality, cracks, erosion 
and corrosion. Both these methods require that there are installed inspection windows. 
By performing a thorough visual inspection several defects of the pipe may be identified, or reasons 
for further inspections can be found. Damage to the outer sheath is the most obvious defect as cuts, 
gouges, abrasion etc. can be located. It should be noted that this can be difficult if excessive marine 
growth covers the pipeline and riser. Other defects observed can be wrinkling of the external sheath 
(caused by torsional force and potential ruptured tension wires), or any form of separation from the 
end fittings. Internal inspection of the carcass can detect cracks or unlocking of the carcass and also 
ovalisation, collapse, or blockage of the bore. 
6.1.2 Annulus pressure testing 
Due to the lack of access to the annulus environment a technique involving gas injection into the 
annulus has been developed. This technology is dependent on functioning gas vent valves at the top 
of the riser. Nitrogen gas is injected at the top of the riser with a pressure below the pre-set vent 
valve opening pressure so that the external sheath is not endangered and the valve set up is not 
changed. 
When injecting the gas the following data should be registered (ref. [14]): 
- Nitrogen injection pressure 
- Stabilization pressure 
- Injection time 
- Stabilization time 
- Injected volume 
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When measuring these values it becomes clear if there is a sudden pressure drop, or if the pressure 
is not stabilised. If that is the case it is an indication of rupture of the external sheath or malfunction 
in the vent valves. The volume injected along with the time used indicates how far down the gas 
reaches in the annulus and can give an approximation to where along the riser there is a breach in 
the outer sheath. This test alone cannot substitute the need for visual inspection, but will give a basis 
for where the close visual inspection should be concentrated. Nitrogen injection can with benefit be 
performed simultaneously with internal and external inspection of the pipeline. In this way there is a 
chance of observing a potential leak through the outer sheath, giving a double confirmation.  
6.1.3 Laser leak detection 
Laser leak detection is an optical leak detection tool that emits a high intensity light or laser to detect 
emission of fluids from pipelines, risers or other subsea modules. The wavelength of the light is 
tuned so that it is reflected of a certain substance of interest, for example hydrocarbons, hydraulic 
fluids or specially developed injection dyes. The reflected light is detected by an intelligent camera, 
and the system is connected in real time to a computer located on the intervention vessel/host 
facility. Software is developed to analyse the data and sound an alarm when a leak is detected. The 
injection dye may be injected into the object that is being inspected (e.g. a water injection pipe) to 
give a clear result. 
 
Figure 18 - Laser leak detection device - Smart Light Devices [26]. 
The system can be fitted to an ROV (see Figure 18), AUV or divers can use handheld devices emitting 
a specific wavelength to detect a single injected substance (ref. [20]). There has also been launched a 
system with multiple wavelength options to detect different substances (ref. [26]). 
The laser leak detection technology is field proven and used over several years. 
6.1.4 Coupon testing 
One of the most difficult elements to measure integrity for in a flexible pipe is the internal polymeric 
layers. The degradation of the pressure sheath is known to cause problems for flexible pipes and 
large uncertainties are experienced with the existing degradation models presented in international 
standards. Currently the only way to inspect this is by installing and test coupons. A coupon is 
basically a pipe segment with the same layers and materials as the rest of the pipe. The coupon is 
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installed in parallel or series with the pipe (see Figure 19) and can be removed for laboratory 
inspection. In operation the coupon will experience the same parameters as the rest of the pipe, i.e. 
pressure, temperature and fluid composition. The coupon should ideally be installed as near the 
wellhead as possible to ensure the worst case parameters. Coupons can also be installed near the 
riser or topside where the sample can be analysed and the results put into an aging model to 
extrapolate the conditions near the wellhead.  
 
Figure 19 - Coupon testing setup [2]. 
 
6.2 New inspection techniques 
6.2.1 Radiography 
Radiography is the use of electromagnetic radiation (X- or gamma rays). The radiation consists of a 
spectre of wavelengths that is projected towards an object. As the radiation penetrates the object a 
part of the spectre is absorbed by the medium. The radiation spectre that has fully penetrated the 
object is captured by a digital detector, located on the opposite side. Different materials cause 
different intensity loss of the projected x-rays. The digital detector sends the result to a computer 
where an image is created, and the materials are differentiated based on the penetrated radiation.  
Computed tomography (CT) 
CT scans are basically a set of radiographic images of the same object taken from different angles 
around it. The CT scanner rotates around the object while sending rays through the object and onto 
the detector on the opposite side. The object is divided into millions of pieces called voxels (can be 
compared to pixels on a digital image). On a 2 dimensional image a voxel is considered a square, 
hence on a three dimensional image a voxel is considered a cube. Each radiographic image measures 
the intensity value of every voxel in 2D. Algorithms in a computer software calculate the intensity 
value of each voxel in 3D as the CT scanner rotates, giving a 3D image of the object. 
Offshore application 
A consortium known as FlexiRiserTest consisting of several R&D, Contracting and Operating 
companies has developed the world’s first underwater NDT DR Inspection System. This system uses 
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the basics of DR together with specially developed algorithms for digital recognition. The system uses 
an external gamma ray source and an opposite positioned digital flat panel used for detection. 
Images that are detected on the flat panel are sent to a computer topside via an umbilical. The 
software developed for this system will filter out the most valuable images to be inspected and 
highlight anomalies such as unlocking of pressure armour, wire cracking, breaking and buckling and 
reduction of wall thickness (due to corrosion or erosion). The condition of the internal pressure 
sheath can to an extent also be inspected through radiographic images. The inspection system is 
mounted onto a robot crawler (see Figure 20), which can be attached to the riser either above or 
below the splash zone. 
 
Figure 20 - Robot crawler with DR inspection tool [28]. 
 
Figure 21 - Radiographic image of a flexible riser [28]. 
When attached, the robot crawler is manuvered up or down the riser taking images along the way. 
Example of a radiographic image taken of a flexible riser is shown in Figure 21. Through trial testing 
(2006) the system was submerged to 20 meters water depth, and was able to inspect flexible risers 
with wall thicknesses of 12 – 100 mm. 
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The Welding Institute (TWI Ltd.), member of the consortium, reports on their web page (www.twi-
global.com) that the system is deployable and can be used by the other members of the consortium. 
They also state that future work includes more underwater trials (seawater) and development for 
deploying the system into deeper waters. 
6.2.2 Ultrasonic testing 
Ultrasonic testing (UT) consists of a power source that sends electrical current to a probe 
(transducer). The probe transforms the electrical current into mechanical energy or sound waves. 
The probe must be in contact with the object that is being observed to allow the sound waves to 
travel though the material(s). To eliminate the air gap between the probe and object a couplant is 
used which usually means lubricating the surface with oil or grease, water can also act as a couplant 
making UT possible under water. Sound waves, or the ultrasonic pulses are transmitted thought the 
material and is reflected when it hits an area of different density. The reflected pulses is either 
detected at the probe that transmits the pulses (pulse-echo mode), or a separate detector is placed 
on the other side of the object to detect the pulses that reaches through the object (through-
transmission mode). Figure 22 shows the basics of defect detection using ultrasonic pulse-echo mode 
testing. A probe is positioned on top of a test object sending the ultrasonic pulse and receiving the 
echo. The computer monitor presents the result in intensity (can also be calibrated to show distance) 
and time. When there are no defects, the monitor shows two single peaks in intensity, transmission 
pulse and back wall echo. When the pulse hits the defect it is reflected in a shorter time and with 
higher intensity than the back wall echo.  
 
Figure 22 - Ultrasonic defect detection. 
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When measuring time and intensity of the return echo one can also measure the thickness of the 
material or layers of materials in testing. This can be used to detect corrosion and erosion of the 
layers as well as cracks and other anomalies. 
Offshore application 
ROV mounted UT tools have been developed for inspection of flexible pipelines. The purpose of UT 
with regards to flexible pipelines is to reveal annulus flooding. The sound waves projected into the 
pipeline needs a couplant between the external sheath and tensile armour wires to travel into the 
steel. Hence if the annulus is flooded with seawater or condensed gases from the bore, this will act 
as a couplant and measurements can be made. Figure 23 below shows the results of an inspected 
pipe with and without water in the annulus. 
 
Figure 23 - Result of ultrasonic inspection of an unflooded and a flooded riser respectively [8]. 
If the annulus is flooded the UT tool can measure wire thickness of the most external tensile wires, 
hence detect corrosion (field proven accuracy of 0.2mm variation; ref. [8]), and also misalignment of 
tensile wires. This system is in use today and Flexlife in cooperation reports on their website that 
their system has scanned over 100 risers. 
6.2.3 Eddy current 
Eddy current testing is a method utilizing a process called electromagnetic induction. An eddy current 
probe includes a wire coil of a conductive material (i.e. copper), which is connected to a power 
source. When electrical current is allowed to flow though the coil it generates a magnetic field 
around the probe (Figure 24 a)). If the probe is positioned close to an object consisting of conductive 
material the probe’s magnetic field will induce eddy currents (electrical current flowing in a circular 
motion) in the object (shown as red circles in Figure 24 b) and c)). The eddy currents will create its 
own magnetic field opposing the field of the probe. If there is a flaw (crack, hole etc.) in the 
conductive material the eddy currents are disrupted. The alternating magnetic field can be measured 
and analysed to confirm anomalies and measure layer thickness. 
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Figure 24 - Basic eddy current theory [18]. 
Offshore application 
Innospection has developed a Magnetic Eddy Current Flexible Riser Inspection Tool (MEC-FIT). This 
tool utilises a further development of a technique called SLOFEC (Saturated Low Frequency Eddy 
Current). The SLOFEC inspection technique uses the principal of eddy currents, as described above, in 
combination with a magnetic field (see Figure 25). When using this system to inspect a flexible pipe it 
has to be calibrated against a similar pipe configuration to have a reference value to be able to 
detect anomalies. As this is an electromagnetic technique couplants are not necessary, and the probe 
do not have to be in contact with the steel layer, hence it can scan through the outer sheath. The 
Pipeline has to be cleaned for marine growth though, due to the limitation of scanner depth. 
 
Figure 25 - Eddy current defect detecting [10]. 
With this technique transversal anomalies and ruptured tensile wires can be detected, but only in the 
most external tensile wires. With the further developed technique used in the MEC-FIT system 
stronger magnetic fields are created and the scanning penetrates further into the flexible pipe cross 
section. In [4] Innospection confirms that laboratory tests with an eddy current scanner has detected 
flaws in the pressure armour layer (through 10mm polyethylene, 2.3mm PVC fabric tape and 2x 3mm 
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carbon steel tensile armour wires). Also a test confirms detection of cracks in the most external 
tensile wires through 200 mm of polyethylene. The configuration of the flexible pipe will influence 
how far the inspection tool can penetrate, but stronger tools are under development. 
6.2.4 Magnetic stress measurement 
The armour wires of flexible pipelines are made of ferromagnetic materials. As these wires are 
subjected to stress, the magnetic properties are altered and can be measured. This is known as 
magnetic stress measurement. For flexible risers this can be used to detect the event of an armour 
wire rupture, or inspect if a rupture has happened in the past. As a riser is in service, the armour 
wires experience tension due to the hang off load and the internal pressure. If a wire ruptures the 
stress level at the rupture point will be zero and also reduced some distance from the rupture point. 
The distance of the reduced stress level depends on the friction force between the layers in the riser. 
Offshore application  
MAPS is a magnetic method where a magnet probe induces eddy currents in the ferromagnetic 
armour wires, in this way the stress in each wire can be monitored. Figure 26 shows the eddy current 
vectors in the armour wires. 
 
 
Figure 26 - Electromagnetic modelling of MAPS probe and the induced eddy current vectors [15]. 
Prototypes of the system have been designed with emphasis on standard components used in the 
offshore sector and tested in laboratory and on a full scale riser (ref. [12, 15]). Though these tests 
verify that armour wire breakage can be determined with this system there are several difficulties 
that still has to be looked into. Mechanical hardness, grain size, texture and other material properties 
affects the magnetic parameters, along with movement of the armour wires this causes distortions in 
the measurements done. To cope with problems like this testing with different frequencies are done 
to recognise and determine the results. A software is designed to manage the frequencies and to 
give an interface where the results can be displayed. 
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Figure 27 - Results of the stress test done by MAPS prototype in 2011 [15]. 
Figure 27 shows the results of a full scale test of a 12” nominal bore with a test rig in Newcastle 2011 
(ref. [15]). The software is tune so that the “normal” stress level in the armour wires are displayed as 
grey. The yellow lines are wires that have ruptured and the red lines occurring at the bottom right is 
a new wire rupture. 
The total stress level that is measured consists of residual stresses as well as the externally applied 
stresses due to weight and dynamic conditions. Since the history of residual stresses is not available 
when performing an inspection the two different stress sources have to be differentiated. This is 
done by measuring the stress in each wire two times with varying internal pressure. In this way the 
residual stress will not vary in the two separate measurements and can be differentiated. 
An offshore inspection using the described stress measurement system was performed on a Shell 
operated Floating Production, Storage and Offloading unit (FPSO) in the UKCS early 2013 [12]. The 
inspected riser was a 3” gas lift riser comprising an outer sheath, two layers of tensile wires, one 
layer of pressure armour, one internal pressure sheath and an internal carcass. In this particular 
inspection there was not detected any wire breaks. It was characterised as a successful deployment. 
Lessons learned will contribute to further development. 
6.3 Summary of inspection techniques 
Table 5 gives a summary of the inspection techniques listed and described in this chapter. The table 
includes a brief description of function, failure detection, positive and negative aspects, development 
status and state of the art applications. 
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# 
Inspection 
technique 
Function Failure detection Positive Negative 
Development 
status 
State of the 
art 
1 
Visual 
inspection 
General 
inspection of the 
pipe integrity. 
Includes manual 
deck inspection, 
subsea diver and 
ROV inspection, 
internal camera 
inspection of I-
tube or carcass 
Outer sheath 
integrity 
(including inside 
I-tube), marine 
growth, pipeline 
movement. 
Internal carcass 
integrity, cracks, 
erosion, 
corrosion.  
External general 
inspection is easy 
and gives an 
overview of the 
pipeline integrity. 
Close visual 
inspection can 
elaborate possible 
failure detected 
with other means 
Subjective 
assessment 
of damage. 
Internal 
inspection 
requires 
planning and 
may force 
production to 
stop. 
Proven 
technology 
AUV's 
available for 
frequent 
inspections 
with pre-
programmed 
surveys [30] 
2 
Annulus 
pressure 
testing 
Injecting nitrogen 
gas through vent 
ports into the 
riser annulus. 
Failure detection 
by monitoring 
pressure, volume, 
and time. 
Integrity of 
internal and 
external pressure 
sheath 
Can detect the 
location of a hole 
in the external 
sheath. 
 Proven 
technology 
 
3 
Laser leak 
detection 
Uses laser to 
detect leaks from 
the outer sheath. 
Integrity of outer 
sheath. 
Can detect 
different 
substances. 
Specially 
developed dyes 
can be injected to 
give clear results 
Time 
consuming, 
can be 
difficult to 
detect small 
leaks. 
Proven 
technology 
Devices can 
be mounted 
on AUV, ROV 
and can be 
handheld by 
divers [20]. 
Wavelength 
of the laser 
can be 
adjusted to 
detect 
different 
substances 
[26]. 
4 
Coupon 
testing 
Removable test 
pipe installed in 
parallel or series 
with flexible 
pipeline. Consists 
of the same 
materials and are 
tested after a 
while to inspect 
the different 
layers. 
Aging of polymer 
layers and 
general 
fluid/material 
compatibility 
Gives an 
indication of 
polymer 
degradation. 
Once a test 
coupon is 
taken out and 
tested it 
cannot be 
replaced with 
the same 
history. 
Proven 
technology 
 
5 Radiography 
X- or gamma rays 
are projected 
through the 
flexible riser and 
onto a digital 
detection plate on 
the other side. A 
radiographic 
image is created 
and can be 
analysed. 
Rupture and 
misalignment of 
armour wires 
and unlocking of 
carcass strip. 
Can be 
submerged and 
gives a 
radiographic 
image of the 
flexible riser. 
Radiation 
danger 
Under 
development 
Prototype 
fabricated 
and tested to 
a water depth 
of 20 meters 
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# 
Inspection 
technique 
Function Failure detection Positive Negative 
Development 
status 
State of the 
art 
6 
Ultrasonic 
testing 
Sends an 
ultrasonic pulse 
through the outer 
sheath and 
analyses the 
reflection. 
Can detect 
annulus flooding. 
Can measure 
tensile armour 
wire thickness 
and 
misalignment if 
the annulus is 
flooded. 
100% accuracy of 
annulus flooding. 
Corrosion 
detection of 
tensile armour 
wires. 
Needs a clean 
surface.  
Proven 
technology 
ROV mounted 
tool in 
operation. 
Over 100 
risers 
inspected to 
date. 
7 
Eddy current 
testing 
Uses a probe to 
cause 
electromagnetic 
induction in the 
ferromagnetic 
materials in the 
flexible riser. 
Ruptures and 
anomalies in the 
most external 
tensile armour 
wires. 
No couplant 
needed. Does not 
require direct 
contact with the 
outer sheath 
Limited 
penetration. 
Excessive 
marine 
growth must 
be removed. 
A test piece 
of the same 
pipe has to be 
available for 
calibrating 
the tool. 
Under 
development 
Laboratory 
tests have 
confirmed 
detection of 
flaws in the 
pressure 
armour. 
8 
Magnetic 
stress 
measureme
nt 
Electromagnetic 
induction is 
induced in the 
tensile armour 
wires so that the 
stress level of the 
ferromagnetic 
materials can be 
measured. 
Stress level in-, 
and rupture of 
tensile armour 
wires. 
No couplant 
needed. Does not 
require direct 
contact with the 
outer sheath 
Limited 
penetration. 
Excessive 
marine 
growth must 
be removed. 
Complicated 
inspection 
method, 
specially 
trained 
personnel is 
need 
Under 
development 
System has 
been 
fabricated 
and tested 
offshore on a 
3" gas riser 
[12]. 
Table 5 - Inspection techniques summary 
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7 Monitoring techniques 
Monitoring techniques are continuously processes for monitoring specific parameters to detect time 
based degradations or sudden failures. By installing monitoring equipment deployment expenses can 
be reduced compared to inspection techniques and real time data can be acquired to minimise 
response time. If monitoring techniques can discover a failure in progress or degradations in an early 
stage the operating companies will have more time to plan mitigation and repair strategies. This 
chapter will explain both conventional techniques that exist and is used today as well as new 
techniques that are under development. The techniques will be presented with theoretical 
background, flexible pipeline application and development status. 
The monitoring techniques that will be described in this chapter are: 
1. Conventional monitoring techniques 
a. Annulus vent monitoring 
b. Annulus vacuum testing 
2. New monitoring techniques 
a. Ultrasonic testing 
b. Torsion monitoring 
c. Fiber optics 
d. Magnetic stress measurement 
e. Acoustic emission 
f. Vibration monitoring 
7.1 Conventional monitoring techniques 
7.1.1 Annulus vent monitoring 
Annulus vent flow pressure and flow monitoring is the monitoring of gas that has migrated through 
the internal pressure sheath and into the annulus (percolation). This gas will rise to the top of the 
riser where it accumulates. To prevent the pressure to build to a dangerously high level it is normal 
to have an integrated gas vent system. This system is a set of automated valves that opens when the 
pressure reaches a certain level. Logging of the amount of gas and the frequency of valve openings 
may help the operator to anticipate certain initiations of failure modes like: 
- beginning of rupture process of tensile armour wires 
- external sheath damages 
- internal sheath sealing failures 
- growth of discontinuities previously introduced in the pipe during termination handling and 
assembly. 
Annulus gas monitoring is a well proven technology, and is widely used among operators. The system 
requires functioning annulus vent tubes, and is a good way to detect if these tubes are blocked. 
Inspecting the gas composition will also give valuable information of the annulus environment, and 
can detect initiating threats. 
7.1.2 Annulus vacuum testing 
Annulus vacuum testing is the opposite of annulus pressure testing. Vacuum is pulled through the 
annulus vent ports at the top end fitting of the riser. The extracted gas is measured and can also be 
analysed to inspect the gas composition in the annulus. This will give indications of corrosion or the 
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presence of gases that can cause degradation in the different layers. After the vacuum is pulled it is 
hold for some time to monitor for leaks in the outer or internal pressure sheath. After the monitoring 
is complete the annulus is refilled with nitrogen.  
Annulus vacuum testing can detect leaks in the internal and external pressure sheath, but cannot 
alone determine where the leak is located. A number of companies offer vacuum testing and it is a 
well-known and proven technique. 
7.2 New monitoring techniques 
7.2.1 Ultrasonic testing 
UT can also be used as a monitoring tool where a stationary clamp on tool is mounted on the flexible 
riser below the still water line. This system can operate on batteries for 3 – 3.5 years (changeable 
batteries). The UT tool tests the annulus integrity every week and sends the results wirelessly to a 
computer every month. Flexlife have developed a system called FlexGuard which is field tested for 3 
months. The system needs some adjustments, but a finished product will in short time be available 
on the market (some operators are already waiting to purchase and use the system). 
7.2.2 Torsion monitoring 
Three simple and smart solutions have been developed to monitor torsion and deformation of the 
emerged part of flexible risers (ref. [14]) 
Deformation monitoring is based on planned interval visual inspections of the riser. A 4000mm x 
20mm longitudinal and two 20mm circumferential bands are painted on each riser. During the visual 
inspection a picture is taken from the same location every time, (can be done from deck level) so that 
the pictures can be compared to reveal unusual movement or deformation. This method will not 
necessarily detect failures, but can give indications and start further integrity investigations. 
Another a bit more advanced method is the torsion monitoring method using a fixed camera directed 
to a fixed plate with a clear straight line painted on it. The camera is installed over the end fitting and 
the target plate is installed on the riser a distance below the bend restrictor. The video signal is 
digitalised and sent to a computer where the angle deformation can be measured with a precision of 
0.3 degrees. The supporting software gives a continuous digital feed and the video is recorded to 
monitor historical movement for a defined period. 
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Figure 28 - Torsion monitoring configuration and monitoring software interface [14]. 
A third technology presented in [14] for torsion monitoring is similar to the camera and target 
configuration is a method based on magnetic sensors and a steel “rig”. The magnetic sensors are 
installed on a rack on the riser top section, and a steel rig is installed further down on the riser with 
steel beams that rises from the rig and reaches the sensors above. In this way the movement of the 
riser is monitored by the magnetic sensors through the displacement of the beams (see Figure 29)  
 
Figure 29 - Torsion monitoring using magnetic sensors [14]. 
The monitoring of torsion can detect wire ruptures at the top end of the riser, and provide input for 
fatigue calculations 
7.2.3 Fiber optics 
Fiber optical monitoring uses a fiber cable that conveys light pulses. The light is reflected back to a 
sensor positioned at the start of the cable that measures the change in wavelength of the reflected 
light. This change is analysed and transformed into property changes along the cable.  
Two different fiber optic technologies can be used for monitoring different values along a pipeline, 
Fiber Bragg Grating (FBG) and Brillouin scattering. 
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FBG 
An optical fiber is used by sending pulses of light through the cable. The light is reflected on the 
“walls” of the cable so the signal can travel for a long distance and also through bends and curves. 
FBG is a technology where predetermined areas (gratings) of the fiber cable where the refractive 
index is altered so some of the light is reflected back to the light source. When the cable is stretched 
or compressed over the altered grating due to strain, temperature or other parameters, a different 
wavelength of the light signal is reflected (see Figure 30). It is the variation in the reflected light that 
can be monitored and translated into change in strain or temperature. Several FBG’s can be 
“written” into the cable along its length reflecting different wavelengths allowing for monitoring of 
multiple points along the cable.  
 
Figure 30 - Fiber bragg grating [http://www.fos-ta.com/FBG-sensors.html]. 
The weakness of this technology is that the monitoring points have to be predefined and there is a 
limit to how many points that can be monitored through the length of the cable. 
Brillouin scattering 
Brillouin scattering is a technology where the entire cable is used as a sensing medium. Light pulses 
are sent through the cable and the light is reflected so it can be analysed. If the cable is subjected to 
strain or temperature differences the refractive index of the affected area of the cable changes, and 
spikes in the reflected wavelengths can be monitored. Measuring the time and wavelength of the 
reflected light can be translated into differences in temperature or strain. The weakness of this 
technology is the spatial resolution (accuracy) which is limited to 1m. For strain sensing in risers the 
accepted limit of spatial resolution is 25 cm, but temperature monitoring has acceptance criteria 
above 1m (ref. [14]). 
Direct optical strain monitoring 
A direct optical strain monitoring system called MODA has been developed for Petrobras. This 
system uses fiber optical cables with integrated FBGs attached directly on each of the most external 
tensile wires. This requires the removal of a strip of the outer sheath to get access to the tensile 
wires. After installing the fiber optics the bare strip of the riser is covered with a polyvinyl-chloride 
based tape to protect the strain sensors for mechanical damage and the wires from the corrosive 
environment. The optical cables are connected to an interrogation unit that relays the results to the 
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Petrobras network. The system setup is illustrated in Figure 31. Petrobras installed this system in a 
first field trial on a semisubmersible platform in Campos Basin in 2009. The laboratory test and field 
trial is described in [17]. Results from the field test concluded in successful strain monitoring of all 
the sensors. There was however some damaged cables after the installation that had to be replaced 
the following year that limited the measurement to 54 of a total of 69 tensile wires until the problem 
was fixed. The MODA system was also able to monitor the wave loads on the pipe where the 
observations clearly detected the wave periods. Also bending of the pipe can be detected as the 
sensors cover the full circumferential length of a pipe segment. 
 
 
Figure 31 - MODA system configuration [17]. 
External sheath wrinkling monitor 
External sheath wrinkling monitoring is a simple and smart system utilizing fiber optic strain sensing 
with FBG (ref. [14]). The theory behind the system is that when a tensile wire ruptures near the end 
fitting connection it is usual to detect wrinkling of the outer sheath some distance below. This 
phenomenon is due to the rupture in one or several wires causes the riser to elongate slightly as well 
as rotate to regain torsional equilibrium due to the spiral configuration of the wires. To monitor this 
event a fiber optic cable is attached to a metallic belt that is installed at the critical distance below 
the end fitting as seen on Figure 32. The fiber optic cable with will detect any change in stress levels 
and will detect the rupture of one or several wires. To improve the range of monitoring, several 
monitoring belts can be installed along the pipe, including inside the I-tube or bend stiffener. 
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Figure 32 - External sheath wrinkling monitoring system [14]. 
Integrated fiber optics 
One method that is being developed is the integration of fiber inside the flexible pipeline/riser. A 
challenge is to insert a slender and fragile fiber optic cable into the pipeline where dynamic forces 
easily can break an unprotected cable. One solution is to install the fiber optic inside a steel tube 
inside the pipeline. This would protect the cable, but would not give the opportunity of strain sensing 
as the steel tube would not experience the same tension forces as the armour wires. For 
temperature sensing though, this would be a sound option, however it is not an optimal scenario 
because a new element would have to be installed in an already “crowded” environment. Another 
method is to integrate the optical cables in prefabricated grooves in the tensile armour wires and 
sealing the cable with epoxy (see Figure 33). In this way the cable would be protected and also 
experience the same strain levels as the tensile wires, giving the opportunity of measuring both 
strain and temperature (ref. [31]).  
 
Figure 33 - Fiber optics integrated directly into the tensile armour wires [31]. 
By using this integrated method, the temperature can be monitored along the entire riser/pipeline, 
and critical segments like inside the bend stiffener/I-tube would be included. Temperature 
monitoring along the riser would allow the detection of external sheath breaching as the seawater 
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ingress causes the local temperature to drop. Measuring the internal temperature or restricted areas 
like bend stiffener/I-tube, buoyancy elements and buried segments would give valuable information 
regarding the aging of polymers. 
The downside of this method is obviously that it cannot be retrofitted, but has to be integrated into 
new flexible pipelines. Another challenge is the spatial resolution for strain sensing over long 
distances. There exist a technology that through fiber optics can monitor both strain and 
temperature along the entire cable with very high spatial resolution. This is done by using light 
sources in both ends of the optic cable, which raises a new challenge regarding flexible pipelines. It is 
however possible to develop this system with a special coating in the end of the cable that reflects 
the light signal up another cable that meets in the far end. This will eliminate the need for two light 
sources. 
7.2.4 Magnetic stress measurement 
The theory for magnetic stress measurement is explained in section 6.2.4 and also applies for this 
section. Different from the inspection method the monitoring method comprises of a static clamp 
that is mounted on the riser. This system gives a continuous monitoring of the stress level of the 
armour wires in the riser. When monitoring over a long period the residual stress history will be 
available and different pressure scanning will not be necessary. This monitoring system has not yet 
been deployed offshore. 
7.2.5 Acoustic emission 
Acoustic emission is the phenomenon of released sound waves from within a material that 
undergoes stress as a result of external forces. Tensile or compressive forces in a material cause 
elongation or contraction of the material which cause acoustic emission. These waves are registered 
via sensors that turn them into electrical signals and convey them to computers which can translate 
them into material behaviour.  
Offshore application 
Petrobras has performed laboratory and offshore testing (ref. [27]) to develop a system for detecting 
tensile wire breakage through acoustic emission technology. A test rig onshore was used to produce 
19 tensile wire failures while recording the acoustic emission. From these tests a spectre of acoustic 
signals where made with the highest and lowest values (energy intensity, amplitude, rise time etc.) to 
anticipate a wire rupture. In addition to this, acoustic emission sensors was installed offshore on a 
production riser to create a filter for ignoring disturbances like environmental forces, riser collisions 
etc. With the filter applied, the sensors where still recording and picked up signals that passed 
through the filter. These were analysed together with the 19 referenced wire break signals to create 
an equation for calculating the probability of a wire break. The system is still under development and 
testing is ongoing. 
7.2.6 Vibration monitoring 
Vibration monitoring is similar to acoustic emission with regards to a specific signal that is released 
from the event of a ruptured wire. When a wire ruptures, the burst of energy that is released cause 
vibration in the riser. This technique uses accelerometers to monitor the vibrations caused by a wire 
breakage.  
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Petrobras has performed a laboratory test (ref. [5]) comprising a flexible riser segment with 6” 
internal diameter. Four separate accelerometers was mounted onto the riser, two on the external 
sheath and two on the end fittings, the test setup is shown in Figure 34. The system has not yet been 
field proven, and there are some questions around the distortion of the signals in an operational 
environment. 
 
Figure 34 - Vibration monitoring laboratory test and field configuration [5]. 
7.3 Summary of monitoring techniques 
Table 6 gives a summary of the monitoring techniques listed and described in this chapter. The table 
includes a brief description of function, failure detection, positive and negative aspects, development 
status and state of the art applications. 
# 
Monitoring 
technique 
Function 
Failure 
detection 
Positive Negative 
Development 
status 
State of the 
art 
1 
Annulus vent 
monitoring 
Logging of the 
vent pressure and 
frequency of 
annulus valve 
openings. 
Analysing of gas 
composition. 
Blocked 
annulus vent 
valves. Gas 
composition 
can give 
indications of 
annulus 
environment, 
hence 
anticipate 
material aging 
and corrosion 
Detects blocked 
annulus vents 
that can cause 
failure modes if 
undetected 
Possible 
contaminatio
n of fluids 
from one 
riser to 
another if this 
is not 
considered. 
Proven 
technology 
Automatic 
gas vent 
monitoring 
systems with 
data logging 
and gas 
sampling 
bottles. 
[Forcetechnol
ogy.com] 
2 
Annulus 
vacuum 
testing 
Vacuum is pulled 
from the annulus 
vent valves, held 
and monitored. 
Measures the free 
volume of gas in 
the annulus. 
Detects blocked 
annulus vent 
valves and 
flooding of 
annulus 
Does not 
require 
production to 
stop 
The location 
of leak 
cannot be 
identified 
from this test 
alone 
Proven 
technology 
 
3 
Ultrasonic 
testing 
Stationary clamp 
on tool mounted 
below water line. 
Sends wireless 
data to topside. 
Same technology 
as for inspection 
technique 
Same as for 
inspection 
technique 
Same as for 
inspection 
technique 
Same as for 
inspection 
technique 
Under 
development 
Prototype 
exists and is 
field tested 
for three 
months 
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# 
Monitoring 
technique 
Function 
Failure 
detection 
Positive Negative 
Development 
status 
State of the 
art 
4 
Torsion 
monitoring 
Monitors torsion 
of the upper part 
of the flexible 
riser compared to 
I-tube or bend 
restrictor.  
Tensile wire 
ruptures 
causing torsion 
of the riser. 
Simple systems, 
relatively easy 
to install and 
operate. 
Cannot 
monitor 
torsion far 
from the top 
of the riser 
Under 
development 
Three 
different 
methods 
developed for 
Petrobras. 
General 
visual 
inspection of 
painted 
guidelines, 
camera 
inspection of 
mounted 
plate and 
magnetic 
sensing [14] 
5 Fiber optics 
Uses fiber optical 
cables to measure 
strain and/or 
temperature 
along the 
riser/pipeline 
Tensile wire 
rupture, breach 
of outer sheath 
High accuracy 
stress 
measurement 
for 
predetermined 
locations. 
Temperature 
measurement 
of the entire 
riser 
Integrated 
cables must 
be installed 
when 
fabricated. 
FBG locations 
must be 
predetermine
d and cannot 
be moved. 
Under 
development 
External 
sheath 
wrinkling 
monitor 
under 
development 
for Petrobras 
[14]. Full 
scale 
integrated 
fiber optical 
temperature 
monitoring 
system 
developed 
and 
performed by 
NKT Flexibles 
[32] 
6 
Magnetic 
stress 
measurement 
Stationary clamp 
tool mounted on 
riser. Same 
technology as for 
inspection 
technique 
Same as for 
inspection 
technique 
Same as for 
inspection 
technique. 
Residual strain 
history 
available after 
continuous 
monitoring 
Same as for 
inspection 
technique 
Under 
development 
Inspection 
tool has been 
deployed and 
tested 
offshore 
7 
Acoustic 
emission 
Sensors detect 
acoustic emission 
in form of sound 
waves due to 
stresses in the 
riser. 
Tensile wire 
rupture 
 Signals 
difficult to 
analyse. 
Multiple 
sources for 
acoustic 
emission that 
need filtering 
Under 
development 
Laboratory 
testing and 
offshore 
signal 
sampling 
performed by 
Petrobras. 
Signal 
filtering 
algorithm 
developed 
8 
Vibration 
monitoring 
Accelerometers 
mounted on riser 
to detect 
vibration  
Tensile wire 
rupture 
 Signals 
difficult to 
analyse. 
Multiple 
sources for 
vibration that 
need filtering 
Under 
development 
Laboratory 
testing 
performed by 
Petrobras, 
confirming 
detection of 
wire breaks 
Table 6 - Monitoring techniques summary. 
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8 Discussion 
Based on the understanding of both failure modes and inspection principles/techniques developed in 
chapter three through seven, an integrity management strategy will be proposed. The different 
inspection and monitoring techniques will be categorised into three IMS areas: 
- Continuous monitoring 
- Interval inspection 
- Explorative inspection 
Both conventional and new techniques will be recommended. Combination of techniques will be 
explored to establish new and more powerful techniques to cover detection of multiple failure 
modes. 
8.1 Reflections 
Based on the failure modes and reported incidents presented in this thesis, two layers of the flexible 
pipe stands out as more critical to integrity than the rest; namely the internal pressure sheath and 
the outer sheath.  
The internal sheath is the most difficult layer to inspect as it is not a ferromagnetic material that can 
be inspected by magnetic techniques. In addition it is impossible to perform visual inspections of this 
layer. Several degradation modes threaten this layer including temperature variations, fluid 
compatibility, pressure and environmental stresses. Despite existing degradation models provide 
recommendation for calculating the state of this layer, they are proven to be insufficient as 
decommissioned pipelines and risers reveal varying results (ref. [1]). Conventional technology offers 
one technique for inspecting the internal pressure sheath; coupon testing. This technique is 
recommended but gives restricted results as the coupon is installed in a location that is not 
representative for the entire pipeline system. As the coupon is removed for testing the history is 
removed with it. 
The most promising new technique for monitoring the condition of the internal pressure sheath is 
the integration of fiber optics. With this solution a complete temperature history of the entire 
pipeline can be provided and used for temperature regulation in start-up and shut-down scenarios. 
By monitoring the temperature in addition to annulus gas composition through vent monitoring, a 
combined dataset will provide valuable information. Reviewing this when testing the coupon samples 
can be beneficial for understanding the degradation mechanisms and updating the models provided 
in international standards. 
The outer sheath is the main barrier for annulus integrity as it prevents seawater from entering. 
However, this is the layer that is most often damaged. Throughout the entire life cycle, from 
fabrication to operation, the outer sheath is threatened. A breach has the potential to cause a 
number of degradations to the internal layers.  
Breach of the outer sheath has been in focus for several years. Conventional inspection and 
monitoring techniques for detecting outer sheath breach exist, while others are under development. 
However, some of these techniques are not instantly conclusive and others may not identify the 
location of the breach, which is necessary for repair. Integration of fiber optics will provide 
immediate detection and location of a breach as the local temperature will drop as seawater flows 
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into the annulus. The problem is that this technique cannot be retrofitted. For existing pipes 
conventional techniques like nitrogen injection and annulus vent monitoring combined with visual 
inspection and laser leak testing is the best solution.  
8.2 Integrity Management Strategy 
Every offshore development, including flexible risers and pipelines, should have their own IMS 
specific for their riser and pipeline system. A proposed IMS is presented below. This plan is divided 
into three categories; continuous monitoring, interval inspection and explorative inspection.  
The IMS should include an inspection and monitoring programme, based on potential failures and 
operating envelope, for each unique development. This plan includes specifics for each inspection 
and monitoring category and also a plan for action when anomalies are detected. The programme 
should start with including the Fabrication Acceptance Tests (FAT) and initial inspection and 
monitoring surveys for use as reference and baseline values for further integrity assessment. This 
information will be critical for defect-detection and life extension assessment. 
8.2.1 Continuous monitoring 
The continuous monitoring covers the methods that provide on-line or frequent data from a 
stationary mounted tool. These data usually consist of a defined parameter such as temperature, 
strain, vent rates etc. The purpose of continuous monitoring is to detect failures or degradations, 
when they happen or when they are emerging, to give the operator time to plan for mitigating 
repairs or further inspections. To get the most out of the monitoring, several parameters should be 
monitored, logged and analysed together, to complement each other. In this way if one parameter is 
abnormal it can be compared with the others to confirm or disprove possible threats. Each 
monitoring technique should be tested shortly after installation to determine a baseline value for the 
parameter of interest to set an acceptance limit. This is done together with the FAT result 
assessment. 
Continuous monitoring is mainly used for confirming that the pipelines and risers operate within the 
design limits. Monitoring can also detect the rupture of the external sheath which is a critical factor 
for the remaining service life of the riser.  
8.2.1.1 Conventional practice 
Annulus vent monitoring 
Annulus vent monitoring is a simple and automatic system for controlling the percolated gases from 
the annulus. This system offers automatic data logging providing information regarding gas 
percolation rate and pressure used for anticipating polymer sheath ruptures. Functioning annulus gas 
vents are critical for riser integrity, the malfunction of these vents will quickly be detected with this 
system. Easy access to gas samples is provided in this system for analysing the annulus environment. 
Gases like H2S and CO2 are dangerous for the different layers in the annulus and can be detected 
from the gas sample tests. 
Annulus pressure monitoring during installation should be considered to detect damage of the outer 
sheath. This monitoring system is well known with extensive field experience. Annulus vent 
monitoring cannot determine where a potential outer sheath breach is located. 
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8.2.1.2 Recommended new practice 
Integrated fiber optics 
By integrating optical fiber cables into the tensile armour wires, temperature monitoring of the 
entire riser, and potentially pipeline, is possible. This can arguably revolutionise the pipeline and riser 
industry, especially for flexible pipes. Full temperature distribution would give immediate detection 
and location of breach of the outer sheath. Outer sheath damages can be fixed quickly, and the 
integrity of the repairs will automatically be monitored. Accurate temperature distribution is also 
valuable for the polymer degradation models. In combination with annulus vent monitoring and 
coupon testing new reliable models can be developed. 
Accurate strain monitoring for the tensile armour wires will provide exact stress measurement in 
each wire and will immediately detect wire ruptures. This can also be useful for fatigue calculation as 
logged data is available when risers are retrieved and inspected. 
The greatest limitation for this system is that it cannot be retrofitted but must be integrated in the 
fabrication process, hence other monitoring and inspection techniques are required for existing 
pipeline systems. 
Combination of ultrasonic testing, vibration monitoring and acoustic emission 
An UT tool has been developed and tested offshore, but both vibration monitoring and acoustic 
emission is under development. The combination of these three techniques would act as a powerful 
monitoring tool with the capability of detecting both annulus flooding and armour wire rupture. 
Separate signal filtering algorithms are required for vibration and emission monitoring, but the 
combination of these could complement each other and possibly anticipate the location of the wire 
rupture. The ultrasonic tool that is developed today runs on changeable batteries, but would require 
an umbilical for power and data transmission if these technologies were to be combined. This would 
be a retrofit system to mount on existing risers. Each system is developed with its own software that 
could be integrated into one for better overview and control. 
8.2.2 Interval inspection 
Interval inspections are inspections that ought to be performed regularly, for example every year, 
two years etc. The purpose of these inspections is to pick up any anomalies that cannot be detected 
from the monitoring techniques. Typical annular inspection is visual inspection of riser and pipeline 
to check the external integrity, or if the pipelines have moved considerably. 
The first set of interval inspections is critical to set anomaly limits, i.e. determine the baseline for 
later inspections. This baseline limit will be used for later inspections to compare the results and 
determine the integrity level. The baseline should start the data logging for each inspection (and also 
monitoring) technique for easy assessment of anomalies. The first inspections after installation will 
also detect if there has been any unforeseen damages during transport and installation. 
8.2.2.1 Recommended practice 
Visual inspection 
Annular visual inspection is recommended for ensuring the integrity of pipelines and risers. Manual 
inspection from deck level and inspection through video camera are simple operations for general 
pipe integrity. Images and videos from the baseline inspection are used for reference. Close 
inspection for critical elements like bend stiffener, riser TDP, end connections and pipeline curvature 
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is recommended. For visual inspection subsea pre-programmed AUV’s can simplify the operation and 
save costs by eliminating the need for ROV deployment. AUV’s can be programmed to follow a 
defined route and inspect critical locations. 
Internal inspection of I-tube or bend stiffener should also be performed in planned intervals. This is 
critical as this is a restricted location that is known to carry risks.  
Annulus vacuum or pressure testing 
Vacuum or pressure testing of the riser annulus will identify if there is a leak in the outer sheath. 
These tests can be done while the system is in operation. The location of the potential leak cannot be 
accurately determined, so exploratory inspection is needed if a breach is detected. 
8.2.3 Explorative inspection 
The last category is named exploratory inspection. If some anomalies or defects are detected during 
continuous monitoring or interval inspection further inspection is needed to explore the threat.  
8.2.3.1 Recommended practice 
Visual inspection combined with laser leak detection 
After anomalies are detected from continuous monitoring or interval inspections, visual inspection is 
a good way to identify and acquire an overview of the failure. Visual inspection should also be carried 
out shortly after large storms, offshore operations or when other threatening activities have taken 
place in the vicinity of the pipeline system.  
If there is suspicion or detection of breach of the outer sheath the visual inspection can be combined 
with laser leak detection to determine the location and severity of the leak. The laser leak detection 
system will improve the survey as small leaks can be difficult to detect only by visual inspection. 
Ultrasonic testing 
When there is a leak in the outer sheath there is an immediate threat of increased corrosion and 
reduced fatigue resistance. This should be detected as soon as possible, but experience shows that 
this problem can go undetected for a long time. To ensure the integrity of the tensile armour wires 
an UT tool can be deployed to scan the riser. UT can identify flooding of the annulus and, if flooded, 
measure the thickness of the tensile armour wires, hence detect corrosion. Corrosion detection 
provides a valuable input for the calculation of remaining service life of the riser, and also 
information for models used for corrosion anticipation in the future. 
Coupon testing 
Coupon testing is the best practice for analysing and inspecting the degradation of the different pipe 
layers, especially the polymer layers. There exists polymer degradation models for calculating the 
status of the polymer layers, but these are not always accurate, and coupon testing is advised to 
check the unique developments, and also improve the degradation models. If this could be 
implemented along with integrated fibre optics this could significantly improve the knowledge of 
polymer degradation due to temperature variations. 
The disadvantage with this testing is that the coupons are normally installed near the wellhead or 
topside. The test piece will not experience the same temperature and fluid composition as the rest of 
the pipeline system. Once a coupon is pulled out and tested it cannot be re-installed with the same 
history of exposure as the rest of the pipeline system.  
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8.2.3.2  Recommended future practice 
Radiography, eddy current testing and magnetic stress measurement 
The future practice for exploratory inspections includes three different technologies that are under 
development. Radiography, eddy current testing and magnetic stress measurement are all designed 
for identifying tensile armour wire ruptures, with different positive and negative aspects for each 
technique. 
Radiography is a promising new technology for inspection of flexible pipes. A prototype is tested and 
has produced radiographic images of a flexible pipe. Software to recognise defects and anomalies has 
been created and is still under development. Radiography can detect tensile wire rupture, wire 
misalignment and pitting from corrosion. The technique has however proven to have low sensitivity 
for detecting small cracks and non-volumetric defects. CT scanning is a very interesting technique 
that is under development. A CT scan of the pipeline can produce a 3D image of the full cross section. 
This will permit detection of transversal defects of the steel layers and polymer layers which cannot 
be done by other inspection techniques than coupon testing. The disadvantage with radiography is 
the radiation danger and safety restrictions. It also has a long inspection time. 
Eddy current testing is a technique for detecting rupture and anomalies as well as thickness 
measurement of the outermost tensile armour wires. The system has low throughput that can cause 
challenges for thick coating layers, but stronger probes are under development. For eddy current 
testing to work a test piece of same configuration as the riser must be available for calibrating the 
inspection tool.  
Magnetic stress measurement is an advanced technology that can measure the stress level in 
individual armour wires. This complex method requires experts to set-up and interprets the result. It 
is time consuming and expensive, but gives valuable information and can detect wire ruptures a few 
meters away from the inspection tool. 
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8.3 Futuristic view 
Integrity management for flexible pipeline systems stands before a potential revolutionary change. If 
some of the new inspection and monitoring techniques that are under development today is applied 
to existing or future developments there is reason to believe that the failure count of flexible risers 
and pipelines will decrease. Retrofit inspection and monitoring tools will enable better control of 
existing developments.  
Apart from the obvious gain of detecting failures and controlling the pipeline under operation, 
another benefit reveals itself by filling the knowledge and technological gaps. Monitoring results and 
better understanding will provide accurate calculations of remaining life and lifetime extension. 
Several pipelines have to date been replace before ended design life due to conservative calculations 
of remaining life. 
New techniques and software for data logging will enable better availability of history and enhance 
the tracing of failure modes.  
By better understanding the threats and failure mechanisms, new pipelines can to a greater extent 
be designed for inspection. This would be enhanced by better information sharing between 
companies and borders. Further development of international standards and recommended 
practices would also add to this aspect. 
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9 Conclusion 
Integrity management for flexible pipelines will never be perfect; pipes will fail and have to be 
replaced also in the future. By implementing new inspection and monitoring systems the failure rate 
will decrease and the industry will establish a better understanding of the behaviour of flexible pipes. 
Following the initiatives of SureFlex and PSA the industry can increase their sharing and cooperation 
in order to provide information and update international standards. 
The most common failure mechanism for flexible pipes today is linked to the internal and external 
polymer layer. Breach of the outer sheath and degradation of the internal pressure sheath have been 
the cause for replacing a large number of flexible risers worldwide. In addition the annulus 
environment with fault in the vent system continues to threaten flexible pipe integrity.  
Based on the conventional and new inspection and monitoring techniques described in this thesis the 
most promising technology is the integration of optical fibres. This technology would enable 
detection and location of a breached outer sheath instantly. It can also be used for temperature 
monitoring for regulating start-ups and shut-downs to avoid rapid degradation and pull-out of the 
internal pressure sheath. 
For retrofit systems a combination of techniques is the best solution for flexible pipe integrity. There 
are several suitable technologies available or in development, but they tend to focus on individual 
failure causes. A JIP involving several manufacturers and operating companies where critical and 
frequent failure modes are discussed, considering conventional and new inspection or monitoring 
techniques, can lead to good results.  
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10 Future work 
This thesis provides a screening of failure modes, inspection- and monitoring techniques of flexible 
risers and pipeline. A logical continuation of this report would be to explore some of the inspection 
and monitoring techniques more in detail. This can be done by calculations combined with laboratory 
tests.  
Due to limitations of this thesis, some tasks are left out that should be explored: 
- Perform screening, describe and assess inspection and monitoring techniques for ancillary 
equipment; 
o Bend stiffener 
o End fittings 
o Spools and jumpers 
o Arch buoys 
o Mooring lines 
o Anchors 
- Perform screening, describe and assess repair techniques for flexible pipelines and risers and 
for ancillary equipment 
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Appendix A – Internal pressure sheath polymer characteristics [2] 
Polymer 
material 
Minimum 
exposure 
temperature 
(°C) 
 
Maximum 
continuous 
operating 
temperature 
(°C) 
General compatibility characteristics Blistering characteristics 
HDPE 
-50 +60 Good ageing behaviour and resistance to 
water-based fluids.  
Some grades are susceptible to 
environmental stress cracking in alcohols, 
liquid hydrocarbons, and surfactants so 
resistance should be verified.  
Good blistering resistance at low 
temperatures and pressures only.  
 
XLPE 
-50 +90 Good ageing behaviour and resistance to 
water-based fluids, weak acids and 
produced fluids with high water cuts.  
Less susceptible to environmental stress 
cracking than HDPE (environments 
include alcohols and liquid hydrocarbons).  
Better blistering resistance than HDPE, 
but traditionally limited to relatively 
low temperature and pressure e.g. 
20,68 MPa (3 000 psi) and 60 °C.  
Recent developments have produced 
grades of XLPE that can withstand 
temperatures/pressures of up to 90 °C 
/ 1500 psi and 70 °C / 3000 psi for gas, 
oil and water  
PA-11 
-20 +65 Good ageing behaviour and resistance 
to hydrocarbons.  
Good resistance to environmental 
stress cracking.  
Limited resistance to acids, including 
heavy bromide brines, at high 
temperatures, methanol, high TAN 
crudes and traces of oxygen – see 
6.5.3 for further details. Limited 
resistance to bromides.  
Weak resistance to high temperatures 
when any liquid water is present.  
 
Good blistering resistance up to 68,95 
MPa (10 000 psi) and 100 °C (212 °F).  
 
PVDF 
-20 +130 High resistance to ageing and 
environmental stress cracking.  
Compatible with most produced or 
injected well fluids at high 
temperatures including alcohols, acids, 
chloride solvents, aliphatic and 
aromatic hydrocarbons and crude oil.  
Weak resistance to strong amines, 
concentrated sulphuric and nitric acids 
and alkaline fluids (recommend pH < 
8,5).  
 
Good blistering resistance up to 68,95 
MPa (10 000 psi) and 130 °C (266 °F).  
 
Table 7 - Internal pressure sheath polymer characteristics. 
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Appendix B – Complete list of failure mechanisms 
 
Potential pipe defects/failure mechanisms for static applications 
Pipe layer Defect 
ref.  
Defect  Consequence  Possible cause  
CARCASS 
1.1  Hole, crevice, pitting, or 
thinning  
Reduced collapse 
resistance and 
reduced tension 
capacity  
a. sand erosion;  
b. crevice, pitting or uniform corrosion (and SSC/HIC);  
c. excessively sour service;  
d. pigging damage;  
e. hydrate formation (caused by excessive pressure 
drop and wet gas) causing pipe blockage and excessive 
pressure build-up in pipe bore.  
 
1.2  Unlocking deformation  Locally reduced 
collapse resistance 
and tension 
capacity.  
a. overbending;  
b. excess tension with bending;  
c. pigging damage  
d. hydrate formation (caused by excessive pressure 
drop and wet gas) causing pipe blockage and excessive 
pressure build-up in pipe bore.  
 
1.3  Collapse or ovalisation  Blocked or reduced 
bore  
a. excess tension;  
b. overpressure built between the different layers in a 
multi-layer pressure sheath design, when the pipe bore 
is unpressurised  
c. rapid gas decompression (RGD);  
d. high initial ovality (manufacturing defect);  
e. excess loading or deformation during installation;  
f. high radial gap between pressure armour and internal 
Pressure sheath (manufacturing defect);  
g. side impact or point contact.  
INTERNAL 
PRESSURE 
SHEATH 
2.1  Crack or hole  Leak of medium 
into annulus and/or 
rupture of outer 
sheath and/or pipe 
rupture/leakage  
a. hole, bubble or inclusion during fabrication;  
b. pressure armour rupture;  
c. pressure armour unlocking;  
d. ageing (embrittlement);  
e. temperature above design levels;  
f. carcass defect;  
g. pressure above design levels;  
h. pigging damage;  
i. environment assisted cracking ;  
j. erosion (smooth bore pipes);  
k. product composition outside design limits;  
l. inadequate material finishing;  
m. fatigue related failure due to thermal and pressure 
load cycling.  
 
2.2  Rupture  Failure of pipe  a. pipe bending (tension side);  
b. collapse (outer sheath leak, low internal pressure, 
collapsed carcass);  
c. ageing and embrittlement;  
d. failure of pressure armour;  
e. fatigue failure due to multiple shutdowns associated 
with vacuum conditions (smooth bore pipe only).  
 
2.3  Collapse  Recoverable, but 
plastic straining  
Excessive reduction in product pressure or excessive 
external relative to internal pressure (no carcass or 
collapsing carcass).  
 
2.4  Ageing 
embrittlement/Chemical 
degradation  
Reduced elasticity 
and greater 
susceptibility to 
cracking; material 
properties 
degradation.  
exposure to production fluids (temperature, pH, 
water/methanol content), chemical injection, drilling 
fluid etc.  
 
2.5  Excess creep (extrusion) 
of polymer into metallic 
layer  
Possible hole or 
crack rupture  
a. operation at pressures and/or temperatures outside 
limits;  
b. inadequate material selection;  
c. inadequate wall thickness.  
 
2.6  Blistering  Possible hole or 
crack rupture  
a. rapid decomposition due to operation at pressures 
and/or temperatures outside limits;  
b. rapid decomposition under inadequate material 
selection.  
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Pipe layer Defect 
ref.  
Defect  Consequence  Possible cause  
PRESSURE 
ARMOUR 
LAYER 
3.1  Individual or multiple 
wire rupture  
Reduced structural 
capacity or pipe 
rupture (burst) or 
extrusion/leakage 
of internal pressure 
sheath  
a. corrosion;  
b. SSC;  
c. HIC;  
d. excess internal pressure;  
e. failure of tensile/backup pressure armour (excess 
tension/pressure);  
f. unlocking;  
g. manufacturing (welding) defect.  
 
3.2  Unlocking  Reduced structural 
capacity or pipe 
rupture (burst) or 
extrusion/leakage 
of internal pressure 
sheath  
a. overbending;  
b. excess tension;  
c. impact;  
d. failure of tensile or backup pressure armour;  
e. radial compression at installation;  
f. excess torsion during installation;  
g. manufacturing defect (fishscaling, uncontrolled 
OD/pitch).  
 
3.3  Collapse or ovalisation  Reduced bore  
reduced structural 
capacity and 
collapse resistance  
a. side impact;  
b. point contact;  
c. excess tension (in service);  
d. radial compression at installation.  
 
3.4  Corrosion  Pressure armour 
tensile failure  
a. sour service/corrosive annulus;  
b. ingress of seawater into annulus.  
BACKUP 
PRESSURE 
ARMOUR 
LAYER 
4.1  Rupture (single or all 
wires)  
Reduced structural 
capacity or pipe 
rupture (burst)  
a. Corrosion;  
b. SSC;  
c. HIC;  
d. excess internal pressure;  
e. failure of tensile/pressure armours;  
f. manufacturing (welding) defect.  
 
4.2  Ovality  Reduced bore  
reduced structural 
capacity and 
collapse resistance  
a. side impact;  
b. point contact;  
c. excess tension.  
 
4.3  Clustering  Uneven support of 
pressure armour 
layer, failure  
a. Manufacturing defect.  
b. Overbending  
 
4.4  Corrosion  Pressure armour 
tensile failure  
a. sour service/corrosive annulus;  
b. ingress of seawater into annulus.  
TENSILE 
ARMOUR 
LAYERS 
5.1  Multiple wire rupture  Reduced structural 
capacity or pipe 
rupture (burst)  
a. corrosion;  
b. SSC;  
c. HIC;  
d. excess tension or internal pressure;  
e. manufacturing (welding) defect;  
f. accidental impact.  
 
5.2  Radial buckling or 
clustering  
Reduced tension 
capacity  
a. overtwist;  
b. compression;  
c. internal pressure below minimum design value;  
d. damaged, aged or inadequately designed holding 
bandages.  
e. overbending  
 
5.3  Kinking of pipe  Reduced tension 
capacity  
a. side impact;  
b. point contact;  
c. loop in line due to design, manufacturing defect or 
installation error.  
d. overbending  
 
5.4  Corrosion  Tensile armour 
rupture  
a. sour service/corrosive annulus;  
b. ingress of seawater into annulus.  
 
8.2  Ingress of seawater  Tensile or pressure 
armour wire 
corrosion 
(especially splash 
zone) vent valve 
blocked open or 
flooded insulation 
layer  
 
 
 
 
 
a. Hole, tear, rupture, crack in outer sheath;  
b. Defective seal in the end- fitting.  
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Pipe layer Defect 
ref.  
Defect  Consequence  Possible cause  
END 
FITTING 
9.1  Internal pressure sheath 
pull-out  
Leak of medium 
into annulus, failure  
a. loss of friction (carcass deformation etc.);  
b. tear;  
c. sheath shrinkage due to temperature cycling or loss 
of plasticiser;  
d. creep.  
 
9.2  Tensile armour pull-out 
(all wires)  
Failure, burst  a. wire break within end fitting;  
b. epoxy failure (sour service);  
c. epoxy failure (high temperature ageing);  
d. loss of friction;  
e. excess tension.  
 
9.3  Outer sheath pull-out  Ingress of seawater 
(hydrostatic 
pressure)  
a. excess annulus pressure;  
b. creep.  
 
9.4  Vent valve blockage  Outer sheath burst 
(if it occurs to all 
vent valves)  
a. debris;  
b. marine growth;  
c. mechanism failure (corrosion etc.);  
d. fabrication errors;  
e. installation/operation error  
 
9.5  Vent valve leakage  Possible seawater 
ingress into annulus  
a. corrosion;  
b. failure of mechanism (seal failure etc.).  
 
9.6  Individual tensile armour 
pull-out  
Reduced structural 
capacity  
a. wire break within end fitting;  
b. epoxy failure (sour service);  
c. epoxy failure (high temperature ageing);  
d. loss of friction;  
e. excess tension.  
 
9.7  Failure of sealing system 
(sealing rings etc.)  
Leak of medium 
into annulus, 
possible vent valve 
blockage, possible 
outer sheath burst 
and pipe leakage 
(failure), possible 
flooding of 
insulation layer and 
possible 
wax/hydrate 
formation in 
flexible pipe bore  
a. fabrication errors – ineffective seal of internal 
pressure sheath;  
b. excess internal pressure;  
c. excess tension or torsion;  
d. inadequate installation;  
e. excessively low production temperature.  
 
9.8  Crack or rupture of 
pressure armour or 
backup pressure armour  
Possible pipe burst 
or reduced 
pressure capacity  
a. corrosion;  
b. SSC;  
c. HIC;  
d. excess internal pressure;  
e. failure of tensile armour layer (excess tension or 
internal pressure);  
f. inadequate material qualification.  
 
9.9  Crack or rupture of 
tensile armour  
Possible 
progressive pull-out 
and pipe failure or 
reduced structural 
capacity  
a. corrosion;  
b. SSC;  
c. HIC;  
d. excess internal pressure;  
e. failure of tensile armour layer (excess tension or 
internal pressure);  
f. Failure due to manufacturing defect.  
 
9.10 Structural failure of end 
fitting body or flange  
Pipe 
burst/catastrophic 
failure  
a. excess internal pressure;  
b. excess tension or torsion loads;  
c. hydrostatic collapse;  
d. corrosion/chemical degradation;  
e. brittle fracture;  
f. fatigue.  
 
9.11 Cracking of pressure 
sheath  
Pipe burst/ 
catastrophic failure  
Fatigue due to thermal stress cycling or pressure cycling  
HOLDING 
BANDAGES 
10.1  Rupture  Possible lateral 
buckling of tensile 
armours  
a. pipe bending;  
b. flooded annulus;  
c. operation in annulus at pressures, temperatures 
and/or pH outside limits;  
d. damage during manufacture/installation;  
e. ageing.  
f. manufacturing defect (loose holding bandage)  
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Pipe layer Defect 
ref.  
Defect  Consequence  Possible cause  
 
10.2 Ageing  Reduced structural 
capacity of holding 
bandage  
 
Material property changes (degradation) arising from 
ageing.  
 
10.3 Excess creep (extrusion) 
of polymer/composite  
Loosening or failure 
of holding bandage, 
loss of or reduced 
support to tensile 
armours and 
possible lateral 
buckling of tensile 
armours  
a. operation at pressures and/or temperatures outside 
limits;  
b. inadequate material selection;  
c. inadequate thickness.  
Table 8 - Potential pipe defects/failure mechanisms for static applications. 
Potential pipe defects/failure mechanisms for dynamic applications 
Pipe layer Defect 
ref.  
Defect Consequence  Possible cause  
CARCASS 
1.1–1.3  As Table 8 for static 
applications.  
As Table 8 for static 
applications and 
reduced bending 
fatigue.  
As Table 8 for static applications.  
 
1.4 Unsupported carcass / 
full extension of carcass 
under its own weight  
Pipe collapse  Loss of carcass support from overlaying polymeric layer  
 
1.5 Cracking/wear  Reduced collapse 
resistance and 
reduced tension 
and bending fatigue 
capacity or 
pressure sheath 
rupture  
a. fatigue + crevice, pitting or uniform corrosion;  
b. carcass-to-carcass wear or friction.  
c. inadequate manufacturing tolerances and controls  
d. excessive curvature of pipe  
INTERNAL 
PRESSURE 
SHEATH 
2.1  Crack or hole  Leak of medium 
into annulus and/or 
rupture of outer 
sheath and/or pipe 
rupture/leakage  
a. to m. As for Table 8 static applications.  
n. fatigue related failure due to bending load cycling.  
 
2.2 to 2.6 As Table 8 for static 
applications.  
As Table 8 for static 
applications.  
As Table 8 for static applications  
 2.7 Rupture  Failure of pipe  Fatigue cracking.  
 
2.8 Wear/nibbling  No adverse 
consequence if 
thickness is 
maintained above 
minimum value to 
prevent blow 
through or internal 
pressure sheath 
crack or hole  
a. abrasion between internal pressure sheath and 
carcass;  
b. abrasion between internal pressure sheath and 
pressure armour.  
PRESSURE 
ARMOUR 
LAYER 
3.1 to 3.4  As Table 8 for static 
applications.  
As Table 8 for static 
applications.  
As Table 8 for static applications.  
 
3.5 Individual or multiple 
wire rupture  
Reduced structural 
capacity or pipe 
rupture (burst) or 
extrusion/leakage 
of internal pressure 
sheath  
a. wear at inter-wire contact;  
b. wear from contact with back-up pressure layer;  
c. cracking along wire;  
d. fatigue failure;  
e. welding defect.  
 
3.6 Longitudinal wire crack  Potential 
elongation to 
critical defect size  
Inter-wire contact and local stress concentration.  
BACKUP 
PRESSURE 
ARMOUR 
LAYER 
4.1 to 4.4  As Table 8 for static 
applications.  
As Table 8 for static 
applications.  
As Table 8 for static applications.  
 
4.5 Individual or multiple 
wire rupture  
Reduced structural 
capacity or pipe 
rupture (burst)  
a. wear from contact with pressure armour layer;  
b. fatigue failure.  
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Pipe layer Defect 
ref.  
Defect Consequence  Possible cause  
TENSILE 
ARMOUR 
LAYERS 
5.1 to 5.5  As Table 8 for static 
applications.  
As Table 8 for static 
applications.  
As Table 8 for static applications.  
 
5.6 Multiple wire rupture  Reduced structural 
capacity or pipe 
rupture (burst)  
Torsion imbalance  
a. wear between armour layers (gap in anti-wear layer, 
loss of lubricating oil);  
b. fretting fatigue;  
c. notch or crack fatigue failure;  
d. fatigue failure.  
e. corrosion or corrosion combined with fatigue.  
 
5.7 Individual wire rupture  Reduced structural 
capacity or pipe 
rupture (burst)  
a. wear between armour layers (gap in anti-wear layer, 
loss of lubricating oil);  
b. fretting fatigue;  
c. notch or crack fatigue failure;  
d. fatigue failure.  
 
5.8 Tensile armour lateral or 
radial buckling under 
compression  
Disorganisation of 
armour wires and 
tensile armour 
rupture  
a. axial compression and cyclic bending;  
b. Manufacturing defect; tension on holding bandages 
lost.  
ANTI-WEAR 
LAYER 
6.1  Wear, cracking  Radial contact of 
armour layers, wear  
a. relative movement between layers;  
b. temperature;  
c. manufacturing defect.  
 
6.2 Clustering  Radial contact of 
armour layers, wear  
Manufacturing defect.  
INSULATIO
N LAYER 
7.1 to 7.3  As Table 8 for static 
applications.  
As Table 8 for static 
applications.  
As Table 8 for static applications.  
OUTER 
SHEATH 
8.1  As items 8.1 & 8.2 in 
Table 8 for static 
applications.  
As items 8.1 & 8.2 
in Table 8 for static 
applications.  
As items 8.1 & 8.2 in Table 8 for static applications.  
 
8.2 Wear, tear  Possible rupture 
due to annulus 
pressure or 
possible hole due 
to wear or 
accelerated 
corrosion of 
metallic armour 
layers  
Abrasive contact with seabed, other lines or other 
surfaces.  
 
8.3 Aging, fatigue  Accelerated 
corrosion of steel 
armour wires  
Temperature exceeding allowable, (particularly when 
thermally insulated by ancillary components such as 
bend stiffener.  
END 
FITTING 
9.1 to 
9.10  
As Table 8 for static 
applications.  
As Table 8 for static 
applications.  
Pressure sheath pull-out and cracking due to layer dead 
weight and inertia  
 
9.11 Cracking of pressure 
sheath  
Pipe burst/ 
catastrophic failure  
a. As 9.11 of Table 8 for static applications.  
b. Fatigue due to bending load cycling.  
 
9.12 Crack or rupture of 
tensile armour  
Possible 
progressive pull-out 
and pipe failure or 
reduced structural 
capacity  
a. Fatigue failure due to non-uniform stress distribution 
in end fitting;  
b. Fatigue failure due to manufacturing defect 
(inadequate surface roughness, surface cracking in wire 
bending process, weakening of wire mechanical 
properties due to bending/heating processes).  
 
9.13 Rupture  Possible lateral 
buckling of tensile 
armours  
a. fatigue failure  
Table 9 - Potential pipe defects/failure mechanisms for dynamic applications. 
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Appendix C – Failure modes on NCS (1995 – 2014), CODAM database. 
 
Anomaly Severity Dimension Pipe 
content 
Cause Failure mode 
Leak Major 8 Oil/gas Coflon layer shrinkage Polymer 
Broken Major 10 Water Micro leakage Other 
Leak Major 8 Oil/gas Coflon layer shrinkage Polymer 
Bulge Minor 16 Oil Unknown Unknown 
Leak Major 9 Water Bending Overbending 
Corrotion Insignificant 16 Oil Not reported Corrosion 
Leak Major 9 Gas 
injection 
 Compression 
Scratch Minor 6 Gas 
injection 
 Other 
Crack Minor 8 Water Unlocked Zeta wires Overbending 
breach of 
outer sheath 
Major 6 Gas  Burst 
Rupture Minor 10 Water  Collapse 
breach of 
outer sheath 
Minor 6   Burst 
Waterfilled 
annulus 
Minor 6 Oil Unknown Annulus 
Hole Minor 6 Oil Blockage of gas release 
valve 
Burst 
Waterfilled 
annulus 
Major 6 Oil Unknown Annulus 
Waterfilled 
annulus 
Major 6 Injection Unknown Annulus 
Waterfilled 
annulus 
Major 6 Injection Unknown Annulus 
Waterfilled 
annulus 
Major 6 Injection Unknown Annulus 
Waterfilled 
annulus 
Minor 6 Oil Unknown Annulus 
Waterfilled 
annulus 
Major 6 Oil Unknown Annulus 
Waterfilled 
annulus 
Minor 6 Oil Unknown Annulus 
Waterfilled 
annulus 
Minor 6 Oil Unknown Annulus 
Waterfilled 
annulus 
Major 6 Injection Unknown Annulus 
Waterfilled 
annulus 
Minor 6 Oil Unknown Annulus 
Waterfilled 
annulus 
Major 6 Oil Unknown Annulus 
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Anomaly Severity Dimension Pipe 
content 
Cause Failure mode 
Waterfilled 
annulus 
Minor 6 Injection Not reported Annulus 
Leak Minor 9 Oil/gas Unknown Unknown 
Leak Major 6 Injection Collapse of coflon layer Collapse 
Leak Major 6 Gas 
injection 
 Burst 
End 
termination 
Major 8 Oil  End fitting 
Leak Minor 11 Water Hole in outer coating Other 
Leak Major 6 Injection Bursted outer coating Burst 
Deformation Major 6 Injection Collapse of carcass Collapse 
Deformation Major 6 Injection Collapse of carcass Collapse 
Deformation Major 6 Oil Collapse of carcass Collapse 
Other Minor 8 Oil Fallen off MWA Other 
Other Minor 6 Water Fallen off MWA Other 
Broken Major 6 Injection HIC Fatigue 
Scratch Minor 11 Water Unknown Unknown 
Broken Major 6 Injection HIC Fatigue 
Broken Major 6 Injection HIC Fatigue 
Waterfilled 
annulus 
Minor 8 Oil Not reported Annulus 
Leak Major 10 Oil/gas Fabrication/design Burst 
Hole Minor 2,875 Gas Lack of vent and pressure 
build-up in the annulus 
Burst 
End 
termination 
Major 8 Gas  Corrosion 
Leak Major 8 Injection Unknown Unknown 
Deformation Major 6 Oil Unknown Collapse 
Deformation Major 6 Injection Unknown Collapse 
Leak Minor 4 Gas  Unknown 
Scratch Minor 6 Oil Unknown Abrasion 
Scratch Major 6 Oil  Abrasion 
Scratch Major 6 Oil Not reported Abrasion 
Hole Major 2 Gas lift Unknown Burst 
Hole Major 10 Oil/gas N/A Abrasion 
Hole Major 10 Oil/gas N/A Abrasion 
Hole Major 10 Oil/gas N/A Abrasion 
Hole Major 11,6 Condensate N/A Abrasion 
End 
termination 
Major 8 Oil  End fitting 
Hole Major 10 Oil/gas N/A Abrasion 
End 
termination 
Major 8 Oil  End fitting 
Leak Major 8 Oil Hydrate plug Other 
Leak Major 8 Oil  Unknown 
Waterfilled Major 16 Gas N/A Annulus 
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Anomaly Severity Dimension Pipe 
content 
Cause Failure mode 
annulus 
Breach outer 
sheath 
Major 8 Oil  Unknown 
Breach outer 
sheath 
Major 8 Oil  Unknown 
Deformation Major 5 Service Collapse of carcass Collapse 
Deformation Major 5 Service Collapse of carcass Collapse 
Deformation Major 8 Oil/gas Collapse of carcass Collapse 
Hole Minor 2 Gas lift Believed to be damaged 
during installation 
Abrasion 
Wear Major 12 Oil/gas Abrasive wear Abrasion 
Wear Minor 12 Water Abrasive wear Abrasion 
Hole Major 16 Gas Wear Abrasion 
Hole Major 6 Injection Lacking end termination 
plug 
Other 
Hole Major 6 Oil Unknown Unknown 
Hole Major 6 Oil Unknown Unknown 
Other Minor 6 Oil  Unknown 
Hole Major 6 Oil/gas Lacking end termination 
plug 
Other 
Other Minor 6 Oil Unknown Unknown 
Breach outer 
sheath 
Major 2 Gas  Abrasion 
Deformation Major 6 Oil Collaps of carcass Collapse 
Outer sheath Major 8 Oil  Unknown 
Outer sheath Major 8 Condensate  Unknown 
Crack Major 6 Oil Collapse of carcass Collapse 
Deformation Major 6 Oil Collapse of carcass Collapse 
Deformation Major 6 Oil Collapse of carcass Collapse 
Hole Major 2 Gas Unknown Unknown 
Hole Major 4 Gas  Burst 
Crack Major 6 Oil Carcass tear End fitting 
Crack Major 6 Oil Carcass tear End fitting 
Deformation Major 6 Oil Collaps of carcass Collapse 
Hole Major 6 Oil Carcass collapse Collapse 
Crack Major 6 Oil Carcass tear End fitting 
Leak Major 6 Oil Carcass tear off Collapse 
Deformation Major 6 Injection Collapse of carcass Collapse 
Broken Major 6 Oil Overload or fatigue Tension 
Outer sheath Major 8 Oil  Unknown 
Outer sheath Major 8 Gas  Unknown 
Crack Major 2 Gas Corrosion fatigue Corrosion 
Deformation Major 9 Gas Carcass collapse Collapse 
Leak Minor 7,5 Gas 1 Burst 
Leak Minor 5 Gas Wear of the outer sheeting Burst 
Deformation Insignificant 11 Water Foreign object Other 
x 
 
Anomaly Severity Dimension Pipe 
content 
Cause Failure mode 
Outer sheath Major 8 Oil  Unknown 
Deformation Major 9 Oil Unknown Collapse 
Hole Minor 8 Oil Anchor replacement Other 
Deformation Major 9 Oil Carcass collapse Collapse 
Hole Major 6 Gas Overpressurised annulus Burst 
Outer sheath Major 7,5 Gas  Abrasion 
Outer sheath Major 8 Oil  Burst 
Table 10 - Reported incidents on NCS (1995 - 2014), CODAM database. 
